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In the last decade, terrorism has been one of the top threats for many countries. During 
this period, military organizations in many of these countries have been utilized as a 
counterterrorist instrument. Leading countries in the current war on terror, namely the 
U.S. and the UK, have used their armies, with all of their high-tech weapon systems, 
against nonstate threats armed with AK-47s and RPGs. Yet in spite of these efforts, a 
military victory against terrorism seems elusive. In many of these countries, the use of the 
military created unintended consequences that led to new problems, which have attracted 
the attention of academia and policymakers. The goal of this thesis is to explore these 
problems caused by the use of the military in a counterterrorism role. 
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The goal of this thesis is to explore the unintended consequences of using the 
military in a counterterrorism role. Since 9/11, countries have increasingly employed the 
military to fight terrorism. Is it possible to conceive of negative effects that the use of the 
military in counterterrorism has brought to civil society, militaries, or terrorist 
organizations? 
In the last decade, terrorism has been one of the top (if not the premier) threat for 
many countries. During this period, military organizations in many of these countries 
have been utilized as a counterterrorist instrument. Leading countries in the current war 
on terror, namely the U.S. and the UK, have used their armies, with all of their high-tech 
weapon systems, against nonstate threats armed with AK-47s and RPGs. The U.S. and 
UK are not alone in using their militaries in counterterrorism tasks. Other countries such 
as Israel and Russia also use their militaries against terrorists. Yet in spite of these efforts, 
a military victory against terrorism seems elusive. In many of these countries, the use of 
the military created unintended consequences that led to new problems, which have 
attracted the attention of academia and policymakers. 
From an academic perspective, the main discussion about the use of military in 
counterterrorism revolves around the issue of effectiveness. In other words, are military 
organizations effective against terrorism? And when, or in which circumstances, and 
against what kind of terrorist groups are the military successful or unsuccessful? All 
cases of terrorist violence have their own context. While some terrorist organizations are 
primarily domestic, others are international in their effects. While some groups seem to 
want a high fatality rate, others have less ambitious goals. Nevertheless, governments all 
around the world that face terrorist threats have relied on their militaries without much 
consideration to these differences. As a result, there is a need to distinguish between the 
cases in which the military option has a potential for success, and the ones in which 
militaries are much more likely to create problems than to solve them. 
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From a policy perspective, the use of the military in counterterrorism presents a 
number of problems. In the case of counterterrorist campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, 
the military coalitions fighting against terrorism find themselves against irregular 
adversaries that hide and operate among the civilian population. This creates additional 
complexities in the already entangled atmosphere of the battlefield, and requires 
militaries to be extremely careful about minimizing civilian casualties. In addition, 
contemporary democratic practice requires military institutions to be accountable to their 
governments, and occasionally to allied powers and to the international community. In 
this complex environment, governments face the dilemma: how can they fight against 
terrorism but stay within the rule of law and the democratic values upon which all 
governments are founded? As a result, there is a need to discuss if the military is a 
suitable instrument that governments can use in finding a way out of this dilemma. 
Another important consideration is that, in the past, a militarized counterterrorist 
response paved the way for authoritarian rule. Military coups in Brazil in 1964 and 
Argentina in 1976 had their roots in their militaries’ engagement in domestic 
counterterrorism roles and missions. Consequently, it is also important to understand how 
the engagement of militaries in unconventional missions like counterterrorism may 
negatively affect civilian control of the military. 
The analysis of the use of the military in counterterrorism has the potential to 
showcase the weaknesses of many recent policies by countries like the United Kingdom 
and the United States. The Bush administration and the cabinet of Prime Minister Tony 
Blair made nearly all of the important decisions about the fight against terrorism, and the 
most important decision was to give military leaders enormous latitude. Barack Obama, 
Gordon Brown, and now David Cameron made no major changes in policy direction. For 
the U.S. and the UK, the main instrument of the fight against terrorism is still the 
military, and no major change in this regard seems likely in the near future. Nevertheless, 
Al-Qaeda still sustains its existence in countries like Afghanistan, Pakistan and Yemen. 
Neutralizing Al-Qaeda in these countries requires a number of political, economic and 
social reforms, and the military option does not give much hope of accomplishing these. 
Moreover, the military option created important unintended consequences that made the 
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fight against terrorism much harder. As Stephan M. Walt has indicated, the policies of the 
U.S. and its allies caused the direct or indirect deaths of many Muslims, which in turn 
antagonized Muslims all around the world. According to Walt’s study, U.S. policies in 
the past 30 years have caused at least 288,000 Muslim fatalities, mostly in the Middle 
East. It does not mean that Saddam Hussein and the Taliban had no responsibility in these 
fatalities, but the perception in the countries where Al-Qaeda finds support is that the 
U.S. is directly responsible for this high number of deaths.1 This perception is clearly 
helping terrorist organizations to recruit, and in turn makes their neutralization much 
harder than before.  
 Therefore, for all the countries that engage terrorist organizations with their 
militaries, it is extremely important to be aware that the use of the military in 
counterterrorism may create the conditions that help nourish terrorism rather than 
diminishing it. 
A. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
Armed conflicts have always created unintended consequences. Although military 
establishments put counterterrorist operations under the title of “low intensity conflicts,” 
it does not mean that problems that militaries create while dealing with terrorism are 
fewer than the complications of traditional high-intensity interstate conflicts. This study 
hypothesizes that the use of military organizations in counterterrorist missions generates 
unintended consequences on three different levels: 1) civil society and politics, 2) 
military institutions and 3) terrorist organizations. In other words, militarizing 
counterterrorism policies yields suboptimal results in terms of social legitimacy, military 
professionalism and recruitment means. 
                                                 
1 Stephen M. Walt, “Why they hate us (II): How many Muslims has the U.S. killed in the past 30 




1. Impact on Terrorist Organizations 
All counterterrorist campaigns seek to put an end to the existence of terrorist 
organizations, but the history of counterterrorism is full of examples of policies that states 
apply, but which create results opposite to those intended. With their tendency to use 
excessive or illegal force, militaries are one of the main factors that lead to these 
undesirable results. First of all, militaries are very good at arousing the emotion of 
revenge that terrorists use highly effectively to fill their ranks. As Martha Crenshaw 
indicated, “if a single common emotion drives the individual or group to terrorism, it is 
vengeance…”2 Therefore, retaliation is one of the possible effects of excessive military 
force, which can include escalation. Terrorist groups develop an instinct for 
organizational survival after they manage to survive their initial years. When faced with 
the high level of violence that military forces usually create, this instinct leaves terrorists 
with no other option but to respond with the same level of violence. 
The most important consequence of military involvement in counterterrorism is 
the increase of group cohesion. When terrorist organizations lose their members in 
conflict, this has a potential to strengthen the feeling of comradeship among the 
remaining members. Moreover, when faced with lethal state repression, terrorists are 
forced to go underground, which in turn leads them to lose their connections to the 
outside world. Losing the connection to the outside world makes terrorists become more 
dependent on their organization and their comrades. As a result, militaries may create an 
environment that strengthens terrorist organizations by improving the group cohesion. 
2. Impact on the Military 
It is clear that fighting against a terrorist organization is much different than 
fighting a conventional foe. Because of this huge difference between fighting terrorism 
and conventional war, and because of the tendency of militaries to prepare themselves for 
a fight between states, militaries are required to make fundamental changes in their 
organizational structures and in the ways that they normally fight in order to counter 
                                                 
2 Martha Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism Past and Present,” in The New Global Terrorism: 
Characteristics, Causes, Controls, ed. Charles W. Kegley (Ann Arbor: Prentice Hall, 2003), 102. 
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terrorism. Those changes in the military may cause a diminishing effectiveness in the 
conventional fighting abilities. Militaries who fight terrorists risk being unable to fight 
against conventional state adversaries. 
Another issue involves resources. There is a trend in the Western world to 
decrease military expenditures. This creates a priority problem for militaries all around 
the world. What should get funded? As militaries need new capabilities and new training 
programs to effectively engage terrorism, this complicates the existing budgetary 
squeeze. In other words, states with small military budgets may be forced to choose either 
a military with conventional duties or a military dealing only with counterterrorism. 
3. Impact on Civil Society and Politics 
Although civil society does not directly participate in armed conflicts, it usually 
suffers more than the combatants. This is also true for counterterrorist campaigns. One 
important casualty for the civilian side comes in the shape of losing their supremacy in 
the ruling of their country. The classic question of civil-military relations (i.e., who 
guards the guardians?) becomes more serious in some countries that use their militaries in 
their fight against terrorism, because militaries develop roles that in normal times belong 
to civilians.  
Another problem caused by fighting terrorism with militaries is the militarization 
of politics. Politics involves finding solutions to the problems of the society. Terrorism is 
also a political problem and needs to be dealt with via political solutions. But if militaries 
and violence take priority over political solutions for a long period of time, there may 
grow a tendency in society to deal with all political problems through the use of arms. 
The third problem is about the potential support of a certain group for the terrorist 
cause. If a terrorist organization claims to fight for the rights of a certain group, the use of 
the military, with its tendency to apply excessive force, can lead to the radicalization of 
the members of this group. Some otherwise neutral civilians may be encouraged to 
become active members or supporters of terrorist groups. There are examples of terrorist 
organizations like ETA that actually provoke the repressive actions of governments as a 
part of their strategy to recruit more people to their ranks. Militaries are equipped with 
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weapon systems that have a high potential to create collateral damage. Militaries also 
have different intelligence structures from the one that is needed in counterterrorist 
operations. These weaknesses make militaries highly likely to injure or kill people with 
little or no connection to terrorism. In the end, relatives or friends of those innocent 
people usually become attractive targets for terrorist organizations in their recruitment 
efforts. 
The last problem related to society can be called the legitimacy problem, and it 
also stems from the potential of military organizations to use excessive force. States 
blame terrorist organizations because of their use of illegal force. But if states use force 
with no regard for legality, then they risk being morally equivalent to the terrorist 
organizations. In those cases when states fail to adhere to the rule of law, they risk losing 
their status of victim and lose the legitimacy of their fight against terrorism, both 
domestically and internationally. 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
As the main purpose of this study is to find unintended consequences of using the 
military in counterterrorist missions and roles, there is a need to analyze the literature on 
the subject of effects of state policies. Unfortunately, there is scant work specifically 
focusing on the unintended consequences of state policies regarding terrorism, but Robert 
Jervis’ classic book System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life clearly shows 
that, whatever the subject, state policies usually fail to bring the results they had 
intended.3 It is no different for counterterrorist policies. As Sir Michael Howard 
indicates, after a terrorist attack occurs, the attitude of “something must be done” takes 
precedence over everything, both among politicians and in society.4 In those cases, 
Crenshaw indicates the possibility that “…government’s response to terrorism will  
 
                                                 
3 Robert Jervis, System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life (Princeton NJ: Princeton 
University Presents, 1997), 61-66. 
4 Quoted in Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response, (London: 
Frank Cass, 2006), 90. 
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diminish democracy more than the acts of terrorism itself.”5 Public pressure usually leads 
policymakers to decide what to do against terrorism in a short period of time and with no 
real analysis of possible consequences.  
According to Jervis, this kind of decision-making process is usually based on 
linear thinking, and linear thinking fails to find solutions to complex problems of political 
and social life like the problem of terrorism. Jervis argues that society and nature are 
pervaded by “systems.” Two main characteristics of systems are that: (1) “a set of units 
or elements interconnected so that changes in some elements or their relations produce 
changes in other parts of the system” and (2) “the entire system exhibits properties and 
behaviors that are different from those of the parts.”6 Accordingly linear thinking, which 
tries to tackle problems as if elements in the system can be dealt with in isolation, fails to 
bring intended results and sometimes make problems even worse. After 9/11 and in the 
following political tumult, the so-called “War on Terror” and the “Bush Doctrine” took 
shape through just such linear thinking. According to the doctrine, global terrorism 
spread from politically and economically unstable countries like Afghanistan and Iraq.7 
The cure for this problem was the promotion of democracy and free markets in these 
countries through the use of force and preventive war, namely the military option. 
According to the National Security Strategy of 2002, promotion of democracy and free 
markets would “make the world not just safer but better.”8 After nearly 10 years of effort, 
it is clear that the fundamental assumptions of this linearly shaped strategy are full of 
mistakes, and as Jervis suggests, the security of the United States and its allies has 
suffered.9 Consequently, there is a need to expand Jervis’ finding about how state 
policies bring unintended consequences for the subject of terrorism. 
                                                 
5 Martha Crenshaw, “Introduction,” in The Consequences of Counterterrorism, ed. Martha Crenshaw 
(New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2010), 2. 
6 Jervis, System Effects, 6. 
7 Robert Jervis, “Understanding the Bush Doctrine,” Political Science Quarterly 118 (2003): 367. 
8 The National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington, DC: The White House, September 
2002), I, 1. 
9 Jervis, “The Bush Doctrine,” 383. 
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Research in counterterrorism requires a clear understanding of the importance of 
defining terrorism as it shapes the perception of the public and their representatives. The 
international community has failed to develop a definition of terrorism that meets with 
universal acceptance. Alex P. Schmid and Albert J. Jongman identify more than 100 
different definitions for the phenomenon of terrorism,10 and in a more recent study, they 
were able to decrease this number to twenty-two.11 Nevertheless, it is clear that there are 
huge differences between academia and governments in defining what constitutes 
terrorism. As the purpose of this work is to make an academic assessment of the 
effectiveness of the use of armed forces in counterterrorist operations, the author will use 
a definition that will facilitate the research by creating an objective and unbiased 
understanding of terrorism. English’s definition of terrorism is one that serves this 
purpose by answering the question of what is terrorism: 
Terrorism involves heterogeneous violence used or threatened with a 
political aim; it can involve a variety of acts, of targets, and of actors; it 
possesses an important psychological dimension, producing terror or fear 
among a directly threatened group and also a wider implied audience in 
the hope of maximizing political communication and achievement; it 
embodies the exerting and implementing of power, and the attempted 
redressing of power relation; it represents a subspecies of warfare, and as 
such it can form part of a wider campaign of violent and non-violent 
attempts at political leverage.12 
This definition offers a solid foundation for a fruitful discussion for assessing the 
effects of using armed forces in counterterrorism missions by preventing an implied 
pejorative understanding of terrorism. 
1. Theoretical Perspectives in the Field of Counterterrorism 
Ideally, states should be able to track suspicious acts by individuals who are 
trying to launch a terrorist organization, and should be able to contain these acts. In 
                                                 
10 Alex P. Schmid and A. J. Jongman, Political Terrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, 
Data Bases and Literature (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1984), 119–58. 
11 Alex P. Schmid and A. J. Jongman, Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, 
Data Bases, Theories, & Literature (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2005), 32–37. 
12 Richard English, Terrorism: How to Respond (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 
24. 
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reality, states are rarely able to do that. Administrations make their counterterrorism 
decisions in a reactive fashion, after a terrorist attack takes place and after it grabs the 
attention of the public. Counterterrorism decisions are reactive because terrorism is 
clandestine and the groups that practice it are small and unpredictable.13 Those 
characteristics also creates serious challenges for governments in terms of finding a 
balance between protecting the rights and liberties of their people and protecting their 
lives from the threat of terrorism. As a result, many scholars in the field of terrorism, with 
a desire to find a solution to this problem, tried to tackle questions like: what types of 
measures are governments able to use against terrorism? Are those measures in 
accordance with the rule of law? And are they effective or not? Those questions in turn 
created two basic models of counterterrorism: the criminal justice model and the war 
model. 
The criminal justice model views terrorist action as a criminal act and proposes to 
fight it with respect to the rule of law.14 Proponents of this school claim that this model is 
more appropriate for liberal democracies that face a terrorist threat. This claim stems 
from the idea that if a liberal democratic country does not pay attention to the rule of law, 
it risks losing its legitimacy by undermining the authority of law, which is the basis of 
constitutional democracy.15 In this model, police forces together with the judiciary 
become the leading instruments of government in conducting the counterterrorism effort. 
In some cases, these instruments are supported by emergency legislation.16 Supporters of 
this model claim that police forces’ closeness to civilian society, because of the nature of 
their duty, makes them much more suitable for a counterterrorist force as terrorists 
perform most of their actions among civil society.17 
                                                 
13 Fernando Reinares. "Democratic Regimes, Internal Security Policy, and the Threat of Terrorism," 
Australian Journal of Politics and History 44 (1998): 351. 
14 R. D. Crelinsten and A. Schmid, "Western Responses to Terrorism: A Twenty Five Year Balance 
Sheet," Terrorism and Political Violence 4 (1992): 334. 
15 Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism and the Liberal State (New York: New York University Press, 1986), 
44. 
16 Ronald D. Crelinsten, "Analysing Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: A Communication Model," 
Terrorism and Political Violence 14 (2002): 89. 
17 Arie Perliger, Badi Hasisi and Ami Pedahzur, “Policing Terrorism in Israel,” Criminal Justice and 
Behavior 36 (2009): 1280. 
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Although it is clear that this model has a better chance of protecting the basic 
values of liberal and democratic countries, its main deficiency is that there are not many 
studies that use empirical evidence and prove the effectiveness of the criminal justice 
model in neutralizing terrorist organizations with speed. Rather, most scholars seem to 
support the model with a normative instinct. 
The alternate to the criminal justice model is the war model. This model views 
terrorism as a threat to the existence of the state and proposes to use military force and 
intelligence agencies with little or no respect to the level of aggression.18 In other words 
in this model, as terrorist organizations try to overthrow the current political power 
structure, they are met with overwhelming force, and military forces are the most 
appropriate instruments in applying the desired level of force.19 
This approach is pretty much the standard response of an illiberal state to terrorist 
violence. Russia’s counterterrorism measures against Chechen separatists in 2000s are a 
perfect example of the application of the war model in a domestic context.20 The United 
States, although not an illiberal state and not as indiscriminate as the Russians, began to 
rely heavily on its military apparatus against terrorist acts with the Reagan 
administration’s air strikes against Libya in 1986.21 This stance continues today, as can 
be seen from the current war on terror in Afghanistan and Iraq. The main defect of this 
model is that it is highly controversial for a liberal democracy to use it, as there is a risk 
of losing the moral and legal high ground, which gives the states the advantage of 
legitimacy over their challengers.22  
Moreover, the main instrument of this model, the military, has an historical 
tendency to act autonomously when conducting its operations and that makes the issue of 
legitimacy more serious because of the lack of civilian control of counterterrorism 
                                                 
18 Crelinsten and Schmid, Western Responses to Terrorism, 310. 
19 Peter C. Sederberg, “Conciliation as Counter-Terrorist Strategy,” Journal of Peace Research 32 
(1995): 299. 
20 Geraint Hughes, “The Military’s Role in Counterterrorism: Examples and Implications for Liberal 
Democracies,” Strategic Studies Institute (2011): 25. 
21 Crelinsten and Schmid, Western Responses to Terrorism, 316. 
22 Perliger, Hasisi and Pedahzur, “Policing Terrorism,” 1279. 
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measures. The classic literature in civil-military relations tries to find the perfect balance 
between democratic civilian control of militaries and military effectiveness. Samuel 
Huntington argues that high levels of military professionalism lead to better civil-military 
relations.23 Morris Janowitz, on the other hand, argues that the organizational style of 
military heavily influences civil-military relations.24 For the purposes of this study, 
arguments that link the threat environment to civil-military relations are especially worth 
considering. According to some scholars in the field of civil-military relations, militaries’ 
engagement with missions like counterterrorism, especially in a domestic context, lead to 
a lack of civilian control over the military. Michael Desch and Alfred Stepan both argue 
that focusing on internal security problems like counterterrorism weakened the civilian 
control of the military and led to military rule in countries like Argentina, Brazil and 
Chile between the 1960s and the mid-1980s.25 Stanislaw Andreski also supports that 
argument by proposing that it is much easier for the civilians to control militaries that 
focus on conventional missions like interstate conflicts.26 Charles J. Dunlap even talks 
about the possibility of an American Coup in the future by indicating the negative effect 
of the current trends on the U.S armed forces (continued expansion in missions like 
counterterrorism and nation-building).27  
Earlier, it was suggested that to respond to terrorism and other non-traditional 
missions with the armed forces may weaken the military’s abilities in conventional war 
fighting. Gian P. Gentile, critical of the U.S. military’s counterterrorism and nation-
building missions in Afghanistan and Iraq, summarizes his point by indicating: “If a rifle 
company commander sits down and reads the Army’s high-profile doctrinal manuals, he 
                                                 
23 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil Military 
Relations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, Belknap Press, 1957), 74. 
24 Morris Janovitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (New York: Free Press, 
1971), 7-16. 
25 Michael C. Desch, Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment 
(Baltimore; London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1999), 30-36; Alfred Stepan, “The New 
Professionalism of Internal Warfare and Military Role Expansion,” in Authoritarian Brazil, ed. Alfred 
Stepan (Yale University Press, 1976), 47. 
26 Stanislaw Andreski, Military Organization and Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1968), 202.  
27 Charles J. Dunlap, “The Origins of the American Military Coup of 2012,” Parameters 22 (1992): 4. 
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learns to be an occupier, a policeman, and an administrator—but not a fighter.”28 Matt 
M. Matthews and Avi Kober propose a similar argument by linking the Israel Defense 
Forces’ humiliating battlefield defeat at the hands of Hezbollah in southern Lebanon in 
2006 to its focus on counterterrorist operations since Israel’s invasion of Palestinian lands 
in 1987.29 Dunlap mentioned another negative consequence of using the armed forces in 
non-conventional missions with regards to resources. According to him, using armies in 
missions other than conventional ones creates a perverse effect by diverting resources and 
focus from the original duties of the military like combat training and war fighting.30 
On the other side of this discussion, retired soldiers like John A. Nagl and Peter 
Mansoor argue that, at least for the U.S. military establishment, the focus must be on 
eliminating terrorism because it poses the greatest threat for the Western world right 
now.31 The main problem with these arguments is that discussions mainly revolve around 
the armed forces of the Unites States and cannot be generalized to other countries, which 
are engaged in counterterrorism operations, too. 
In addition, as Crelinsten and Schmid indicate, although use of force against 
terrorists can be effective in destroying their coercive capabilities in the short term, there 
is also a high probability of creating cycles of violence and counter-violence, revenge and 
counter-revenge or creating more political leverage for terrorists by creating public 
sympathy, which in turn provides a new recruitment ground for terrorist organizations.32 
As Maria Rasmussen indicates, in the case of Spain, ETA used these cycles of violence 
as a part of their strategy and named it as action-repression-action spiral.33  
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33 Maria Rasmussen, “Argentina: The End of Terrorism Through State Terrorism,” (paper presented at 
4th International Conference on Terrorism: “The End of Terrorism. Lessons from a Comparative 
Perspective,” Zaragoza, Spain, November 15-16, 2010), 18. 
 13 
Another side effect of the war model is that if the state fails to adhere to the rule 
of law and applies tactics like the “dirty war” in Argentina in the 1970s and 1980s, this 
can create a counterproductive effect and cause increased group cohesion in terrorist 
organizations. According to Moyano, this is mostly because terrorists develop a 
perception that the organization defends them from the dangers of the conflict, and also 
because of their insistence on honoring the sacrifices of their fallen comrades.34  
Although the criminal justice and war models help scholars in shaping their 
arguments and research in the field of terrorism, in real life they do not exist in their 
purest form. Most of the countries apply parts of both models in a mixture that best 
applies to their specific contexts.35 
C. METHODS AND THESIS OVERVIEW 
Nearly all countries in the world maintain armed forces to counter threats to their 
national interests. The critical question is whether terrorism should be in the mission 
definition of militaries or not. If the answer is yes, under what conditions should this 
happen? What if militaries fail to eliminate the threat of terrorism? 
In order to find out the unintended consequences that militaries create while 
trying to achieve acceptable results against a terrorist threat, the author will focus on case 
studies in which state policies against terrorism failed to bring the intended results even 
after a long period of time. The first focus will be on the case of the British Army in 
Northern Ireland (1969–2007), because it is a unique case in which the state changed its 
policy from a war model to a criminal justice model. This change paved the way for 
success against the IRA. A discussion of the initial responses of the British government 
to the IRA in the 1970s will help to identifying the weaknesses of using the military, and 
it will also help to understand how the change in counterterrorism policy to the criminal 
justice model helped to find a way out of terrorism.  
                                                 
34 Maria José Moyano, Argentina’s Lost Patrol: Armed Struggle, 1969-1979 (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1995), 158. 
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Next, the case of Israel against Palestinian terrorism will be examined, as it will 
particularly show that militaries that focus heavily on counterterrorism missions lose their 
effectiveness in conventional fighting. The focus will especially be on the conflict 
between Israel and Hezbollah that took place in 2006.  
Data and information gathering will mostly rely on secondary sources because 
these will provide much better background information and offer less biased analysis of 
the cases being analyzed. The author will also use some government reports as primary 
sources, especially while trying to assess the effectiveness of counterterrorism policies. 
The thesis will consist of four chapters. Chapter I provided general background 
information about the counterterrorist policies implemented by governments and about 
their possible unintended consequences. Chapters II and III will look at the cases of 
Northern Ireland and Israel, respectively. In both these cases, the focus will be on the 
negative effects of militarized counterterrorism. In Chapter IV, all the findings of the 
study will be gathered to discuss the consequences of using the military in 
counterterrorism missions and roles. 
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II. THE BRITISH ARMY IN NORTHERN IRELAND 
Northern Ireland was the scene of a sectarian conflict and terrorist campaign 
between 1968 and 2007. One of the main actors in this scene was the Irish Republican 
Army (IRA). The split that took place in the IRA in 1970 led to the formation of the 
Provisional IRA (PIRA), and since then the PIRA has been the foremost terrorist group in 
the conflict between the terrorists and government forces. Other terrorist groups like Real 
IRA on the Catholic/Nationalist side and the ones like Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) or 
Ulster Defense Association (UDA) on the Protestant/Loyalist side also took part in the 
conflict. Government forces usually ignored these other terrorist groups (especially the 
ones on the Protestant side) because they did not pose any significant threat against the 
police or the army. Therefore, the counterterrorist efforts of government forces usually 
took place against the activities of the PIRA, which sought to establish an all-Ireland state 
on the island by expelling the UK from Northern Ireland. It is important to note that, even 
though the start of the “Troubles” was largely due to the civil rights protests organized by 
the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA), the goal of PIRA’s terrorism 
campaign always focused on reunification of the island. In relation with that, it is 
appropriate to identify the conflict in Northern Ireland as an ethnic inter-communal 
struggle between two different identities (i.e., the Protestants and the Catholics).36 
The United Kingdom was mainly a conciliator between these two entities. 
Nevertheless, as a result of the terrorist attacks, the UK government found itself in the 
middle of a counterterrorist campaign, which lasted for more than three decades. The 
British Army was one of the main actors of the government’s counterterrorist effort. 
Since its deployment to Northern Ireland in August 1969, the Army stayed in the center 
of many controversies. Although deployed to bring an end to the problems in the island, 
the army itself became a part of the problem especially during the peak of the conflict in 
the beginning of the 1970s. This chapter will primarily focus on the inefficiencies of the 
British Army as a counterterrorist force in Northern Ireland. Secondly, the positive effect 
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of the British government’s decision to give police forces primacy in the counterterrorist 
campaign will be analyzed. The findings of this chapter prove that British Army’s leading 
role in the counterterrorist campaign in the beginning of 1970s played an important role 
in the escalation of the conflict, and only after giving primacy to the police forces in the 
middle of 1970s did the UK start to pave the way to success against the terrorist threat. 
Events that led to the deployment of the British Army had their roots in history. 
The island was partitioned into two pieces after 26 counties in the south formed the 
independent Ireland in 1922. Six counties in the north stayed as a part of the UK and 
were governed by a local parliament, which is usually referred as “Stormont.” In the 
elections that followed, Protestants won the 40 of 52 seats in Stormont and in order to 
sustain the advantage they gained against the Catholics in the state structure, they started 
to use the powers of the government. The aim was to prevent Catholics from gaining 
political power and influence, which would possibly lead to unification with Ireland. 
Unionists best expressed their aim with the motto of “No Surrender.”37  
The discrimination against the Catholics gradually increased and started to 
become unbearable in the beginning of the 1960s. The most important problem was 
economic deprivation. It was much harder for a Catholic to find a job in government or 
the private sector than it was for a Protestant. In addition, traditional industries of 
Northern Ireland like shipbuilding and textiles were in decline. There were also problems 
in government housing as a result of discrimination. Nevertheless, Stormont was 
unwilling to address these problems due to fear of losing the Protestant supremacy in the 
region. Catholics responded to the discrimination by forming the NICRA in 1967. The 
NICRA followed the example of civil rights movements in the United States. The 
organization assembled marches to protest discriminatory policies of Stormont and 
demand social reform. 
Although these marches took place peacefully at first, they caused a growing fear 
in the Protestant population that the movement could lead to unification with Ireland. 
Loyalists started to organize violent attacks on the marches in the end of 1968. The 
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violence between the two groups escalated during the summer of 1969. The Royal Ulster 
Constabulary (RUC), the police force of the island, and its reserve force B Specials were 
in many cases overwhelmed by the intensity of these riots and clashes. Moreover, 
Catholics were blaming the RUC and especially the B Specials for taking sides with 
Protestants during these events. Catholics were largely right in their allegations about the 
RUC and B Specials because, as part of the discrimination, the majority of these forces 
were Protestants, and a considerable number of police were in a very close 
relation/sympathy with loyalists and the idea of loyalism.38 
The Apprentice Boys March of Protestants in Londonderry that took place on 
August 12, 1969 was the event that brought the British Army to the streets of Northern 
Ireland. Although Stormont was aware of the possibility of violence between Nationalists 
and Unionists, the government had decided to allow the march to take place with the fear 
of political backlash. Though half of the 3,000-strong RUC were in Londonderry to 
control any possible violence, when what later became known as “Battle of the Bogside” 
started, it soon became clear that it was out of RUC’s capacity to contain the violence 
between the two communities.39 Stormont used all its security capabilities to suppress the 
uprising, which spread to the other parts of the country during the process, before 
demanding the use of military from the British government. In response, the 1st Battalion 
the Prince of Wales’s Own Regiment of Yorkshire moved to Londonderry in the early 
evening hours of 14 August 1969 and became the first Army unit to deploy to the streets 
of Northern Ireland. A spokesman in Whitehall promised that the soldiers would be back 
in their barracks in a couple of days. In August 1969, the number of British troops in 
Northern Ireland was 2,700 in three brigade areas. The number reached its highest at 
30,300 in July 1972.40 
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Figure 1.  Northern Ireland41 
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(accessed November 13, 2012). 
 19 
The mission of the Army was to establish a barricade in areas that connected 
Catholic and Protestant neighborhoods, therefore preventing clashes between the two 
communities. Public reaction to the soldiers’ presence on the streets was mostly positive. 
Catholics viewed the military as a protection from Loyalist attacks. A Private from the 1st 
Battalion of the Parachute Regiment described how the initial stages of military 
operations were like a honeymoon: 
We used to do observations from the top of Divis Flats—always tea and 
coffee from the Catholics. We had a position down on the peace line, and 
every morning at 6:30 this little old lady used to travel across with a fully 
cooked breakfast for two of us, every morning…At Christmas we were 
invited out for dinners and on every step there was a bottle of whiskey to 
take back to the boys….At that stage I had no fear. Things were good.42 
 Unfortunately, the honeymoon period did not last long. Military and political 
leaders made a couple of serious mistakes in important turning points. When coupled 
with the tactics of the Republicans, these mistakes led to one of the most lethal and 
complicated terrorist campaign in history. 
A. FALLS ROAD CURFEW 
The first big mistake took place in the predominantly Catholic Falls Road area of 
Belfast. On Friday, July 3, 1970, a RUC unit and two platoons of troops conducted a 
search for arms that started at 4:30 pm and was nearly over by 5:30 p.m. after the units 
found a cache of small arms. A couple of minutes later, a large riot erupted in protest of 
the search operation. Republicans had viewed the event as an attempt to render the 
Catholic community defenseless against Protestant attacks. Protesters used bricks, stones 
and small arms fire against the Army units, and the Army replied with CS gas (tear gas), 
and small arms fire. The overall military leader in Northern Ireland at that time was 
General Ian Freeland. As the General Officer Commanding (GOC), he was commanding 
all troops in Northern Ireland. In an attempt to control the escalating violence, the GOC 
imposed a “curfew” in the area. The curfew lasted for thirty-four hours and, while 
continuing to fight against rioters, soldiers also conducted searches in houses that they 
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suspected of harboring weapons and ammunitions. The Army’s conduct during the 
curfew, with its tendency to use excessive force and not respect persons’ private lives and 
property, created enormous animosity towards the military among the Catholic 
community. The soldiers had fired 1,454 rounds and had used around 1,600 cartridges 
and cans of CS gas.43 A study of arrests of curfew breakers also revealed that none of 
them had any kind of criminal offences related to terrorist activities.44 
The Army’s tendency to use firearms during the events caused several innocent 
civilian casualties. William Burns was standing at his doorstep together with one of his 
neighbors and was merely watching the events when he was shot dead by soldiers’ fire. 
An Armored Personnel Carrier (APC) struck Charles O’Neill, aged 36, while he was 
trying to communicate with soldiers. Zbigniew Uglik, a 24-year-old freelance journalist, 
also was shot dead by the Army when he was mistaken for a gunman. In all, four 
civilians were killed and sixty-eight injured during the events.45 
In addition to innocent civilian casualties, misbehavior while conducting searches 
in houses helped to alienate Catholics from the British Army. Mrs. Marry McCann of 
Plevna Street accused soldiers of “dashing into her house and ripping up the linoleum on 
the kitchen.” She added: “They smashed the windows, wrenched the locks off the doors 
and then pulled the staircase down.” Seamus Kennedy from Granville Street blamed the 
soldiers for ordering his twin sisters out of their beds.46 
According to the Army, the responsibility for the innocent people’s sufferings lay 
on the gunmen and their violent behavior against the soldiers. Although the Army had a 
different perspective about the events, the damage had been done and after “Falls Road 
Curfew” the Catholic community was no longer on friendly terms with the Army.  
Behind the soldiers’ misbehavior was the influence of viewing the operation as a 
battle or war. The Army’s focus was to end the violence immediately. Therefore, it 
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focused on control over territory as in traditional military operations and, to achieve this 
aim, soldiers applied brutal and suppressive actions against whoever seemed to try to stop 
their actions. After all, in an Army report to London, the events were described as “a 
battle.” For the soldiers, mistakes were only natural in battle.47 
The Curfew had both political and diplomatic repercussions. On the political 
level, many moderate Catholics started to identify themselves with the Republican 
movement. A Catholic from Downpatrick commented: “As a Catholic I cannot but feel 
bitter that…an immeasurable amount of suffering has been visited on my co-
religionists…this time by the very forces which initially were called in to protect them.” 
An elderly woman said: “They will never beat the Irish. They will never beat us like 
that.”48 In thirty-four hours, the Army’s “cordon/curfew/search” operation had created an 
important propaganda and recruitment instrument for Provisionals specifically and for the 
Republican cause generally. On the diplomatic level, demands of some Catholic 
politicians like Paddy Devlin asking for the intervention of Ireland to protect Catholics 
caused tensions between Dublin and London. Ireland’s Minister of External Affairs, 
Patrick J. Hillery, paid a secret visit to the Falls Area on July 6; this visit also infuriated 
London and he was blamed for diplomatic discourtesy for visiting the area without 
informing British officials.49 
The legality of the Curfew was also questionable. In a meeting in Parliament after 
the events, Ministry of Defense (MOD) officials declared: “No formal curfew was 
imposed…Restrictions on movement were imposed in the interest of the safety of the 
population as a whole and to restrict the operations of armed criminals.”50 Nevertheless, 
the Army’s situation report (SITREP) for the day acknowledged the curfew by saying: 
“at 2200 hours curfew orders issued for the Falls Area, this curfew to remain until further 
orders.”51 The Army was operating in Northern Ireland under the common law. 
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According to the common law, in case of a riot or an insurrection every subject including 
soldiers and police had a right and legal duty to use force to stop the rioters. Yet the 
common law did not authorize security forces to impose curfews. The only legal basis 
that gave permission to a curfew was the “Special Powers Regulations” of the Stormont 
government. According to the 19th article of these regulations, Stormont had a statutory 
power to impose a curfew in Northern Ireland. The GOC had not requested from 
Stormont the authority to impose a curfew in the Falls Area under these regulations and 
had taken the decision by himself. As the common law did not allow the GOC to do so, 
and the Stormont did not authorize it under the Special Powers Regulations, the curfew 
imposed over the Falls Area was illegal. 
The Falls Road Curfew, with its negative effect on the Catholic community, was 
mainly a result of insufficient legal frameworks and the mistakes of inexperienced and 
untrained military forces that were not suited to work in an urban environment with an 
original police duty. The event caused enormous changes in the relations between the 
Army and the Catholic community. One soldier described this change:  
The week before the curfew, I would actually march my troops unarmed 
into the Falls to a Catholic church to go to church to show that we had 
confidence in [the Catholics]. We were unarmed and we marched down 
the road and into the church. A week later it was a reverse situation. I 
don’t believe the Army would have marched down since that day, 
unarmed down the road.52  
Unfortunately, it was not the last mistake of the British Government and security 
forces and the circumstances went from bad to worse. PIRA started to escalate its 
campaign against the security forces during the rest of 1970 while using propaganda 
opportunities like the Falls Road Curfew to increase its ranks. The number of incidents 
and deaths were clearly showing the escalation. While there were 73 shooting incidents in 
1969, it was 213 in 1970. The number of bombing incidents had risen from 10 to 170 and 
the number of deaths had nearly doubled from 14 to 25.53 
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Brian Faulkner, Stormont Prime Minister since March 23, 1971, was under 
enormous political pressure because of the deteriorating security situation. The Protestant 
community demanded much more robust security measures from the government. In 
response, Faulkner declared in a speech in Stormont on May 25: “At this moment any 
soldier seeing any person with a weapon or seeing any person acting suspiciously may 
fire either to warn or may fire with effect, depending on the circumstances and without 
waiting for orders from anyone.”54 This declaration caused disturbances among the 
Catholic population and they labeled it as a formal policy of state repression. PIRA also 
used the declaration for propaganda purposes whenever a civilian was killed in disputed 
circumstances, by saying that it was because of Army’s “shoot to kill” policy. As the 
political rhetoric toughened against the terrorist attacks, the PIRA increased the intensity 
of its attacks against the security forces and against the symbols of the Protestant 
community and the Protestants themselves. 
B. INTERNMENT 
When the PIRA reacted violently to the annual Protestant parades that started in 
the beginning of July 1971, Faulkner started to view the option of internment as the only 
other major counterterrorist instrument in his arsenal. Internment had worked during the 
1956–58 IRA campaign and many Unionist hardliners were thinking that it would work 
again. In 1957, the internment had been applied in both the south and north of the island 
and had indeed been effective in reducing the level of violence during that time; however, 
Dublin was not in a position to support internment this time. Dublin’s lack of support was 
seriously undermining the possibility of success because it was easy for the Republicans 
to go and find refuge in the southern side of the border.  
General Harry Tuzo had replaced General Freeland in March 1971 and had been 
the GOC NI for nearly four months when Faulkner started to pressure him for the 
internment. He was openly against the internment because he thought he was in a 
position to reduce violence by using alternative strategies like larger cordon and search 
operations or greater restriction on border traffic. In a conversation with the Chief of 
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General Staff (CGS) Sir Michael Carver, he stated: “he did not recommend internment on 
military grounds: he considered it militarily unnecessary.”55 Nevertheless, the worsening 
security situation was forcing Faulkner to use internment. By the beginning of August 
1971, there had been over 300 explosions, 320 shooting incidents and over 600 people 
had been treated in hospital for injuries caused by terrorist incidents. Under these 
conditions, London gave green light to “Operation Demetrius” (the codename for the 
internment operation) on August 5.56 
The Army was responsible for the implementation of Demetrius. The RUC was to 
provide the list of names; 3,000 soldiers would then detain those named from their 
houses, with the hope of finding them sleeping in their beds peacefully. As it did in 
classic conventional operations, the Army Headquarters in Northern Ireland (also known 
as Lisburn) prepared a detailed plan for the execution of the operation and rehearsed it 
beforehand. Although these rehearsals did not include soldiers actually going out on 
streets and walking around their assigned houses, it created some unusual activities that 
were more than enough for Republicans to understand that internment was close. 
Statements by politicians and the discussion about internment in the press had also helped 
Republicans to be alert for an immediate internment operation. Therefore, when 
Operation Demetrius started at 4:15 a.m. on Monday, August 9, the most important 
terrorists were not sleeping in their beds waiting for the Army. Three hundred and forty-
two people were arrested and the number of Protestants among them was zero. The fact 
that no Protestant was arrested that day disturbed the Catholic community enormously 
and further alienated them. 
Although some government officials claimed that the internment and the 
following interrogation of internees saved many lives, it was a fact that the number of 
deaths had increased after the introduction of internment. In the following week, twenty 
people died and it was almost equal to the number of deaths that took place during the  
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first half of the year. It did not take much time even for the soldiers to understand that the 
internment had created a total fiasco. The commander of the 1st Battalion, The 
Gloucestershire Regiment, stated: 
It was a complete disaster. It turned a large number of the nationalist 
population, who at that time had been firmly on our side and very sensibly 
so, against us. To my simple mind, as a regimental soldier, it was lunacy. 
What it did was to put a few people inside who probably did not matter 
very much and it did not intern the people who did matter.57  
One of the main problems that caused internment to be a total failure was the lack 
of intelligence. Since the Army’s deployment to Northern Ireland in 1969, the RUC was 
on the sidelines and had lost its capability to produce intelligence about the terrorist 
activities. In addition, the Army had not been able to create an intelligence structure that 
would cover the intelligence vacuum created by the inefficiency of police. Therefore, the 
list of suspects that became the basis of internment was relying on old data. The Army 
knew the lists were doubtful, but they had nothing better to go on. As the arrests started it 
became apparent that intelligence at hand was really poor. One of the suspects was a 77-
year-old man who had been in the IRA campaigns of the 1940s and 1950s. Another was 
blind, and another in Armagh area had been dead for four years. In some cases, soldiers 
found out that the man they tried to find was living next door to the address they first 
tried and understandably these mistakes caused antagonism towards the military.58 
The other big mistake was the lack of supervision over what the Army did with 
the arrested people. The interrogations that took place after the internment were under the 
sole control of military technicians and there were no supervision from senior officers or 
politicians. Military intelligence specialists are trained for extracting information from 
prisoners of war (POW). They usually focus on learning information like the unit of the 
POW, formation of the units, their positions, their leaders and the overall morale of the 
units. The information extracting process is swift as time is of essence in using the 
gathered information. Therefore, the interrogation techniques that the Army used were 
not sensitive to the political situation. During the interrogations, the Army used what is 
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called the “Five Techniques,” which included wall-standing, hooding, deprivation of 
sleep, and deprivation of food and drink. The Army had developed the techniques after 
soldiers were subjected to similar behaviors when they were interrogated as POWs by the 
Chinese or North Koreans during the Korean War. Only eleven of the arrestees had been 
subjected to these techniques, but when the word got out that the Army had tortured 
people while interrogating them, it became a total embarrassment for the British 
government.  
Torture allegations forced the British government to conduct two inquiries about 
the techniques that were used during the interrogations. The first inquiry concluded that 
there was no torture or brutality but there had been a “measure of ill-treatment.” The 
second one concluded that the techniques that interrogators used had been extremely 
effective in extracting information.59 The Irish government was not satisfied with the 
results of the British inquiries and took the case to the European Court of Human Rights. 
In its verdict, the court ruled that Britain was guilty of “inhuman and degrading 
treatment.”60 Overall, Operation Demetrius ended up as one of the biggest mistakes that 
the British government and the Army did during all of the counterterrorist campaign in 
Northern Ireland. After the internment, the Catholic community felt much more isolated 
and the PIRA had a better environment to rule in this isolated atmosphere. As a result of 
growing animosity toward the British government and the British Army in the Catholic 
community, the PIRA started to act as an alternative to the current governing structure. 
They collected protection money, allocated houses to people on Housing Executive 
estates, gained money through providing transportation with the fleet of black taxis, and 
even provided sports and social centers. They established their own justice system by 
using acts like tarring-and-feathering, kneecapping, and murder. In the end, the 
internment led the British government to further lose its legitimacy in the eyes of 
Catholics, and the PIRA was more than ready to fill this legitimacy gap. 
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C. BLOODY SUNDAY 
At the end of 1971, the Army was far away from establishing a secure 
environment in Northern Ireland. When compared to 1970, shooting incidents had risen 
from 213 to 1,756, bombing incidents had risen from 170 to 1,515 and the number of 
deaths including both civilians and security forces had risen from 25 to 174.61  
The third grave mistake of the British government and the Army took place on 
January 30, 1972 in Londonderry. On that Sunday, 1 Parachute Regiment of the British 
Army killed thirteen people, seven of them under 19 years old, and injured another 
thirteen, including one woman.62 This event (later to be known as “Bloody Sunday”) 
started as a peaceful march of the NICRA. The main aim of the march was to protest the 
government’s internment policy. It was also a challenge to the Stormont’s authority over 
the region as the government had put a ban on marches since August 9, 1971 and had 
renewed the ban at the beginning of 1972. 
The military planned to contain the march in a certain area in order to prevent any 
violence flaring up between the Catholics and Protestants. Nevertheless, the Army 
expected a confrontation with the Derry Young Hooligans (DYH). The Commander of 
Land Forces (CLF) in Northern Ireland, Major General Robert Ford, described the DYH 
in a memo sent to his superior GOC General Tuzo:  
[DYH] are gangs of tough teenage youths permanently unemployed, have 
developed sophisticated tactics of brick and stone throwing, destruction 
and arson. Under cover of snipers from nearby buildings, they operate just 
beyond the hard-core areas and extend the radius of anarchy by degrees 
into additional streets and areas.63 
Derry’s Protestant community was extremely disturbed by the acts of DYH and 
the CLF thought that if the DYH chose to riot against the military at the end of the march, 
this would give the Army a very good opportunity to identify and arrest its ringleaders, 
therefore crushing the backbone of the Hooligans. General Ford brought the 1 Parachute 
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Regiment from Belfast to conduct the arrest operation. One reason for the selection of the 
1 Para was that it had a reputation as tough on protesters in its operations in Belfast; the 
CLF hoped that this reputation had reached Derry and therefore would cause a level of 
deterrence over the rioters.64 The plan was that the Royal Green Jackets were going to 
contain the march, and when the Hooligans started to attack the soldiers and became 
separated from the harmless civilians, 1 Para was going to come in and arrest the leaders 
of the DYH. 
The march started rather peacefully in a sunny afternoon. The number of 
marchers was around 5,000. As the crowd closed in to William Street where the Army 
had placed a barrier, the mood suddenly changed from peaceful to violent. The hooligans 
took positions in front of the march and started to throw stones and bricks at the soldiers 
manning the barricade. Brigadier General Patrick MacLellan was the commander of 
British troops in Derry at the time of the operation, and he was the one who gave the 
order that started the arrest operation of 1 Para. He ordered the arrests after he became 
totally convinced that the rioters were separated from the peaceful marchers.  
From this moment on the accounts of events differ greatly as both the Nationalists 
and the Army told a different story. The marchers and some bystanders alleged that the 
Army was not fired at, while the Army and some other witnesses like Guardian reporter 
Simon Winchester indicated that a wire-cutting party of soldiers were fired at by a 
possible IRA sniper from the Rossville Street flats which overlooked the Republican 
dominated areas of the city. While it is not totally clear who fired the first shot that day, 
what is clear is that the soldiers of 1 Para shot twenty-six people in highly controversial 
circumstances. It was not only the soldiers who were shooting. As 1 Para entered the 
scene, terrorists fired at them with their revolvers and sub-machine guns. Nevertheless, 
there was no evidence that any of the victims were armed and firing back at the soldiers 
at the time of shooting. Although the terrorists deserved to be blamed for using the  
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civilian crowd as a screen while they were trying to shoot soldiers, the public and 
political perception of Bloody Sunday was that it was a massacre of innocent civilians 
and a huge blunder for the British Army. 
1 Para’s aggressive attitude during the incident was the main reason that created 
this blunder for the Army. The soldiers of the battalion clearly viewed the area as a 
military battle zone and regarded the rioters as their enemy. An army officer described 
the attitude of 1 Para: 
The Paras are trained to react fast and go in hard. That day they were 
expecting to have to fight their way in. It was very tense. In those street 
conditions it is very difficult to tell where a round has come from. Once 
one was fired, that section, quite frankly, lost control.65 
A Para soldier who actually been there that day and fired shots at people who he 
believed as terrorists defined the mindset of his unit before and during the events: 
The weapons were ready cocked. We were ready to go. As far as I’m 
concerned, we were under fire. It changed from an ordinary ‘scoop-up’ 
arrest operation to ‘hey, someone is trying to kill me! Let’s find out who it 
is and do the job back.”66 
That is the attitude that you would expect from a Parachute soldier in a hostile 
environment. He does not consider himself as a crowd control element; he just looks for 
targets, identifies targets according to his judgment and simply shoots them. Lieutenant 
Colonel Derek Wilford was the commander of 1 Para Battalion at the time of the events. 
He also acknowledged the military mindset during the events in an interview: “Quite 
honestly, I owned the Bogside in military terms, I occupied it.”67 This military attitude is 
obviously detrimental, especially in urban environments. Tony Geraghty explains why it 
is so harmful: 
In wartime, missiles, machine-guns, even artillery are used to destroy a 
sniper. On a civilian battleground, the real victory is in the minds of 
people afterwards. Front-line soldiers, trained for a sacrificial role behind 
enemy lines [like the parachute soldiers], dedicated to taking as many as 
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possible of the enemy with them before they die, are not the best choice 
for urban warfare against terrorists dressed as civilians, a war fought in a 
jungle of moral subtleties.68 
In all the mistakes that the British government and the Army made in Northern 
Ireland, Bloody Sunday was the gravest of all. It not only gave the PIRA an enormous 
boost in terms of support and recruits, but also in the eyes of the members of PIRA, it 
legitimized their killings. It also led to the disbandment of the Stormont government and 
imposition of direct rule of Northern Ireland by the British government on March 28, 
1972. In a good way, it also caused British politicians and soldiers to understand that a 
military solution to the problems of Northern Ireland was impossible. One young officer 
who served in Northern Ireland during events like Internment and Bloody Sunday 
affirmed this belief: 
I suspect for the majority of soldiers at my level in those days, it was the 
realization that probably we were not going to win by just a military 
solution alone. Indeed at that time we thought we were still winning. But 
certainly I think with the outcry of ‘Bloody Sunday’ with the deaths of so 
many civilians, and the international storm of protest that that caused, we 
realized, I think, that a solution by military means alone was no longer 
possible, even if it was desirable in the first instance.69 
After “Bloody Sunday,” violence in Northern Ireland reached its all-time highest 
levels. The number of shooting incidents rose from 1,756 in 1971 to 10,631 in 1972. The 
number of bombing incidents rose almost 20% compared to 1971 and reached 1,853. The 
number of deaths rose from 174 in 1971 to 470 in 1972.70 In order to establish an 
acceptable level of law and order, on July 31, 1972, the military started Operation 
Motorman, which lasted until December 1, 1972. For this operation, the military made its 
largest troop concentration since the end of the Second World War. Over 28,000 soldiers 
took part in the operation.71 The number of troops in the island was increased by  
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reinforcements coming from Britain and Europe. Motorman helped to decrease the level 
of violence in the region significantly, but was unable to stop all terrorist activities of the 
PIRA. 
As happened in Operation Motorman, the British government often needed to 
reinforce troop levels in Northern Ireland to contain violence when it seemed to be 
getting out of control. These reinforcements came either from mainland Britain or from 
the units that were stationed in Europe under NATO missions. As a result, the British 
Army got distracted from its original mission, which was the defense of Europe under 
NATO. Initially, the Army leadership viewed this as an opportunity for the infantry to 
sharpen their fighting skills. Nevertheless, it was not only the infantry that were assigned 
to this mission in Northern Ireland. Armor, artillery and engineers also needed to join the 
campaign and as the campaign got longer, it started to distract the British Army from its 
original missions. The sources and the training time that needed to be used for improving 
conventional war fighting skills were used for developing police type skills and resources 
went to the acquisition of crowd control equipment. As a result, commitment of troops to 
Northern Ireland had some adverse effects over conventional fighting skills of the British 
Army. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that the British Army proved itself as a 
conventional fighting force when it won the victory against Argentina in the Falklands 
War of 1982.72 
D. POLICE PRIMACY 
The fundamental step in marginalizing terrorist activities was the British 
government’s decision in 1977 to give the police primacy in fighting terrorism. By that 
time, both the British side and the Republicans understood that the conflict was not going 
to end through violent means solely. Accordingly, PIRA had started to increase its 
political activities and the British politicians had started to take more initiative in shaping 
the strategy against the terrorists. Police primacy largely came as a result of this rising 
level of influence of civilians in policymaking. Under this new policy, the government 
viewed the activities of terrorists as criminal acts rather than military ones. By doing so, 
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the Army had the chance to reduce its profile in the region and started to get rid of its 
reputation as an occupying force. As a result, PIRA lost the ability to portray its activities 
as a liberation war between two armies. Police primacy brought other advantages, too. As 
the police force was much closer to the local population, it had a better chance to obtain 
useful intelligence. Unlike soldiers, police stayed in the area of operation permanently 
and built relations with the local community. These relations, in time, turned into 
intelligence links. Close proximity to people also helped the police to track the mood on 
the ground. In the meantime, with the police doing much of the counterterrorist missions, 
the possibility of British soldiers dying in operations decreased. In turn, the British 
government had the chance to implement policies more freely without any domestic 
pressure caused by the death of soldiers. Lastly, by putting police forces on the forefront 
of counterterrorism efforts, the government aimed to create an image of normality. 
Without such an image, it would be too hard for politicians to search for a political 
solution to the problems in the region. The police primacy made its impact in decreasing 
violence with great haste. The number of shooting incidents dropped from 1,908 in 1976 
to 1,081 in 1977. Bombing incidents halved from 1,192 to 535, and number of deaths 
decreased to 112 in 1977 from 297 in 1976.73 
The police primacy, however, did not mean the end of the Army presence in the 
region. After June 1977, the government intended to use them largely for undercover 
work and left conventional law enforcement duties to the police. In spite of this intention 
of the government, the military continued to have its say over the security policies and 
maintained its primacy in some Republican dominated enclaves and in rural areas like 
South Armagh. In this new police primacy phase, the military continued to undermine the 
overall counterterrorist effort with some of its actions. For instance, the military refrained 
from coordinating its undercover operations and intelligence with the RUC because of the 
fear that the information would end up in wrong hands and any operation would be 
compromised. Unwillingness of the military to coordinate with the police led to some 
really serious mistakes. On one occasion in July 1978, a patrol of four Special Air 
Service (SAS) soldiers (the SAS had been publicly committed to operations in Northern 
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Ireland in 1976, although a number of SAS soldiers had been secretly serving there since 
1969) shot and killed 16-year-old John Boyle after mistaking him as a terrorist. One day 
before the incident, John Boyle had found a weapon in a graveyard next to his family’s 
fields and had informed his father about the presence of the weapon. After his father 
contacted the police about the situation, the police decided to ambush the place in case 
someone came to collect the weapons. Police informed the SAS about the situation and a 
SAS patrol set up the ambush together with a detective constable, near to the graveyard 
on the same night. The police informed the family about the ambush in the morning but it 
was too late. Young John Boyle had returned to the site out of curiosity and, unaware of 
the ambush, was shot dead by the SAS troops. The soldiers also arrested the boy’s 
brother and father, after they arrived to the scene and the Army announced that three 
terrorists had been stopped by an Army patrol. When the mistake was realized, the RUC 
made the explanation that Boyle family had no connection to any terrorist organization. 
In the following trial of soldiers for murder, both the military and police blamed each 
other for the mistake and as a result the relations and coordination between both sides 
deteriorated. In the end, again the overall counterterrorism effort suffered and the 
Catholics blamed the government for introducing a new kind of law: the “SAS law.”74  
Coordinating intelligence between the police and the military has also been a 
problematic issue, both before the police primacy and after. The army had established 14 
Intelligence Company in 1973 to gather intelligence, to recruit and to run informants. In 
1976, SAS joined the intelligence structure and in 1981 the Force Research Unit (FRU) 
was tasked with the issue of identifying and recruiting agents. The RUC, especially after 
the police primacy in 1976, augmented its capabilities in intelligence gathering. The 
coordination between these different intelligence organizations was attempted in various 
ways. In the early 1970s, the coordination was established by Joint Operations Centers. 
Effective coordination was only established near the end of the 1970s by the appointment 
of a “Director and Controller of Intelligence” and by the establishment of “Tasking and 
Coordination Groups” (TCG) in each Brigade area. These TCGs increased the level of 
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coordination by bringing the representatives of different intelligence organizations 
together in every different operational area. 
Nevertheless, the level of coordination and cooperation between the military and 
police remained far from being perfect. The military long remained reluctant to accept 
police primacy. Police primacy also caused tensions in civil-military relations. Military 
leaders criticized politicians for being soft against the terrorists with the policy of police 
primacy and, when the security situation seemed to worsen after events like the murder of 
Lord Mountbatten in 1979, the GOC Sir Timothy Creasey pressured the government to 
return to Army primacy and tough measures like internment.75 Between 1969 and 1993, 
security forces in Northern Ireland killed 348 civilians, 194 of whom had no connection 
to any terrorist organization. Of these 348 killings, 297 were committed by the military. 
Only two soldiers have ever been convicted for any of these disputed killings, due to 
legislations that are highly protective of disputed actions of security forces. By violating 
one of the most basic democratic principle that all citizens are equal before law, 
consecutive British governments throughout the “Troubles” both damaged their 
legitimacy in the eyes of some parts of the population and indirectly legitimized violent 
acts of the terrorists by leaving no channel for people to seek and find justice for the loss 
of their loved ones other than resorting to violence.76 
The British Army officially ended its operations in Northern Ireland in January 
2007. Throughout its long deployment, the military had never been able to totally 
eliminate the terrorist threat caused by the PIRA and the British government had to 
publicly announce that it could not militarily defeat the PIRA. The military only managed 
to contain the terrorists at a certain level but PIRA remained as a threat. Moreover, the 
PIRA can be said to have achieved considerable success against the Army by managing 
to remove the Stormont parliament, by creating the perception of itself as defender of 
Catholics, by making large parts of the Catholic community view the Army as an enemy, 
and by provoking a cycle of action and overreaction especially in the early 1970s.77 The 
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conflict in Northern Ireland ended after the signing of the Good Friday Agreement in 
1998. The end came largely as all parties to the conflict restrained themselves from using 
force to find solutions to their problems, problems that had always been inherently 
political. 
E. CONCLUSION 
When the Army first deployed to the streets of Northern Ireland in 1969, the 
problem seemed simple. Violence had reached a level that the local police force was 
unable to contain it by itself; therefore, there was a need for reinforcements. The Army 
was the solution to this urgent problem. During the initial years of the conflict, successive 
British governments failed to supply the Army with a consistent overall strategy. The 
British politicians tried to achieve a position of impartiality between the Catholics and the 
Protestants, but failed to find a balance between the political and military factors. In the 
lack of political guidance, the Army had to take the responsibility of shaping the political 
and military policy for the province. In the end, the Army became a problem by itself as 
it started to become the primary tool of the British government in the face of rising 
violence caused by terrorist activities. 
First of all, the Army, with its tendency to use excessive force and with its view of 
counterterrorism operations as a war, triggered events like the “Falls Road Curfew” and 
“Bloody Sunday.” The Army’s tough attitude towards terrorists worked to the advantage 
of PIRA by alienating the Catholics, and increased the support and recruits that the PIRA 
took from the Catholic community. A soldier from 1st Battalion of the Parachute 
Regiment described the reasoning behind being tough in counterterrorism operations: 
“Our philosophy was that a guy cannot throw a stone if he is running away from you and 
therefore we used to get stuck into them.”78 This kind of attitude eventually led to a spiral 
of violence and around 1972, Northern Ireland nearly became ungovernable. With the 
increasing number of casualties from the Army, soldiers started to view every rioter as an 
enemy and dealt with them accordingly. One soldier noted: “I do not care what anybody 
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says, we were at war and against an enemy that was good … you could feel the hatred. It 
was like an animal, like something from Hell. And we hated them too with the kind of 
hatred I never thought could get into me because I am quite a nice bloke.”79 Another 
soldier from the Royal Green Jackets mentioned how the Army had lost its temper in the 
face of rising violence: “I do not think we differentiated nearly enough between those 
who were the terrorists and those who were normal members of the population, and I 
think we paid very little regard to the impact that our operations would have on the 
majority of population.”80 The attitudes toward the British soldiers among Republicans 
were likewise. Pat Cox, an avid Nationalist, described his perception of the conflict: 
“After all, we did not invite the British here. They came by force of arms many hundreds 
of years ago. They maintain their presence by force of arms and they will have to be 
removed by force of arms.”81 In the end, the Army with its tough attitude towards the 
Catholic community became a symbol of hatred amongst them, and as a result the 
conflict escalated to unimaginable levels. 
The second problem was the lack of coordination between the Army and police 
and between the military leaders and politicians. Many times, military leaders and 
politicians could not agree on the strategy to deal with the PIRA. As most of the 
problems on the surface were security related, the military demanded a bigger say in the 
shaping of security policy and regarded military power as the fundamental way of dealing 
with the terrorists. Politicians usually were much aware of the political character of the 
conflict and knew that any solution that would bring peace to Northern Ireland was going 
to be a political one. In the beginning of the 1970s, there was no effective civilian control 
over the military in shaping the overall strategy in Northern Ireland and the military 
leaders, as they were naturally expected to do so, tried to solve the problems by using 
military power extensively. As the British government and politicians become much 
more involved with Northern Ireland as a result of the rising level of violence, they 
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looked for a solution in a less militarized and more politicized way and Republicans 
started to engage in normal political processes. The cooperation between Army and 
police was also problematic, usually due to organizational politics and personality 
clashes. Many military officials also believed that some of the RUC officers had their 
allegiance to the Unionist cause and therefore refrained from working closely with them 
with a fear of possible information leaks to Unionist groups.82  
Lastly, the problem of the intelligence structure remained among the most 
important causes of serious mistakes in Northern Ireland. As the RUC became 
marginalized in directing the security policy in 1969, the Army had to create its own 
intelligence structure and gather information from an environment that was largely alien 
to military units. In order to have timely and useful information, the Army and later 
Special Air Service (SAS) and RUC Special Branch developed new intelligence units and 
tactics. In the face of an inflation of intelligence organizations, there appeared a need to 
coordinate all these efforts. Only after the establishment of TCGs in late 1970s, did an 
effective intelligence structure take shape in Northern Ireland.83 
The findings from the Northern Ireland case support the main arguments of this 
study. The repressive actions of the British military helped the terrorists in recruiting and 
in further radicalizing the attitudes of existing members. The British military also had to 
devote an enormous part of its force to the conflict in Northern Ireland and had to ignore 
its main duty of defending Europe through NATO at that time. Nevertheless, it proved 
that it maintained its ability to fight and win conventional wars in the Falklands War in 
1982. In addition, the highly autonomous position of the military with regards to 
counterterrorism policymaking in the early 1970s caused strains in the civil-military 
relations when civilian politics regained the initiative in policymaking in the middle of 
the decade. It can be said that there might have been worse problems in civil-military 
relations, if Britain had not been an established democracy. Lastly, Britain faced the 
threat of losing its image as a country respecting human rights after the incidents in 
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which the military used excessive force. As a result of these incidents, the legality of the 
counterterrorism actions of the government was put into question, both domestically and 
internationally.   
Overall, the use of military in Northern Ireland failed to normalize the security 
situation, especially at the beginning of the 1970s when the military was given a free 
hand in choosing and applying policies. The Army’s tendency to use excessive force, its 
lack of intelligence about the region, and its unwillingness to cooperate with civilians and 
other security forces led to serious mistakes. Because of these mistakes, large parts of the 
Catholic community overtly or covertly supported the PIRA and some of them chose to 
become part of it. In the end, while the intended aim was to put an end to violence, the 
introduction of British Army to Northern Ireland led to more deaths and troubles. 
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III. THE ISRAELI DEFENSE FORCES IN 
COUNTERTERRORISM AND THE SECOND LEBANON WAR 
The Israeli Parliament decided in March 2007 to name the July 12-August 14, 
2006 conflict between Hezbollah and Israel the Second Lebanon War. In this 34-day long 
war, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) failed to prevent almost 4,000 rockets from hitting 
northern Israel. As Uri Bar-Joseph, a prominent authority on Israeli security issues, 
mentioned: “For the first time since its establishment in 1948, the IDF failed to achieve 
one of its most fundamental goals—the defense of Israel’s hinterland from enemy 
attacks.”84 How come one of the best fighting armies of the world failed to defend its 
country against an adversary that is not capable of fielding more than a couple thousand 
fighters? 
This chapter will explain this outcome and other unintended consequences caused 
by the military’s heavy involvement in counterterrorism through an analysis of the IDF’s 
transformation of mission priorities in the last 25 years. This analysis reveals that the 
IDF’s heavy focus on policing missions in the occupied territories of the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip in the last quarter century severely impeded its capability of fighting large-
scale joint force operations. In addition, in some cases military actions helped terrorist 
organizations rather than eliminating them.  
A. ISRAELI COUNTERTERRORISM AND THE INTIFADAS 
Since its foundation in 1948, Israel and its citizens have been the targets of 
countless numbers of terrorist attacks, both inside and outside the Israeli territories. As 
early as 1950, these terrorist attacks caused 50 civilian casualties. The number rose to 97 
the following year and to 182 in 1952.85 Against this terrorist threat, Israel’s main 
strategy was to conduct reprisal raids against the known bases of terrorists, which were 
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mainly located in the neighboring Arab countries. The aim of these raids was to deter 
Arab countries that were supporting terrorists in their countries by making them pay a 
heavy price for this support. The then Chief of Staff (COS) of the IDF, Lt. Gen. Moshe 
Dayan, summarized this strategy in these words: 
We cannot guard every water pipeline from explosion and every tree from 
uprooting. We cannot prevent the murder of a worker in an orchard or a 
family in their beds. But it is in our power to set a high price on our blood, 
a price too high for the Arab community, the Arab army or the Arab 
government to think worth paying.86 
In spite of this persistent terrorist threat, the focus of the IDF stayed heavily on 
training and acquiring weapons for a conventional interstate conflict. The IDF and the 
policymakers named the terrorist threat as an “on-going” concern and did not let these 
concerns overshadow the primary threat posed by the presence of large and hostile Arab 
armies all along the Israeli borders.87 While addressing the Knesset on October 21, 1985, 
Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin stated the secondary or low-priority position of terrorism 
for Israel by saying: “[terrorism] hurts, it is annoying and disruptive, but it does not 
constitute a threat to the country’s very existence.”88 Nothing, even the 1982 Lebanon 
War, which was an offensive movement that aimed to give a deadly blow to the Palestine 
Liberation Organization’s (PLO) terrorist infrastructure in Lebanon, seemed to effect the 
position of the Israeli security establishment in putting the conventional threats ahead of 
all others. 
However, the large-scale public riots that started in the occupied territory of the 
Gaza Strip in December 1987, which was called the intifada, created a new security 
environment that no longer permitted the IDF and the Israeli government to treat the 
threat of terrorism as a low-priority security concern. What started in the large Jabalya 
refugee camp as a funeral-protest after the death of four Palestinians in a traffic accident 
with an IDF tank turned into an all-out civilian rebellion, and dragged all of Israel—its 
government, its armed forces—into a quagmire. The rebellion soon increased its intensity 
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and spread to the West Bank. In the first year of the intifada, a total of 314 people died, 
most of them Palestinians.89 From 1988 to 1993, 421 Israelis were killed by Palestinians 
while at least 1,385 Palestinians were killed by Israeli security forces during the same 
period.90 While many of the attacks against Israeli civilians and security forces were less 
than serious incidents such as stone throwing, the Israeli fatalities caused by terrorist 
attacks undertaken by newly emerging radical Islamist terrorist groups like Hamas and 
the rising number of fatalities of Palestinians caused by the actions of security forces 
forced the IDF to change its perception towards the intifada. In order to suppress this 
rebellion, the IDF started its largest operational commitment in the beginning of 1988, 
which has not ended yet. 
The IDF’s transformation from a conventional minded force to a riot control 
apparatus started rather reluctantly. The IDF leadership treated the intifada as another 
short-lived demonstration that had taken place in the territories before, and as happened 
before, used military units in a hurried fashion without giving them any kind of 
constabulary training whatsoever. Talented officers also refrained from taking command 
positions in the units assigned in the territories. This refrainment showed the lower 
importance given to counterterrorist missions by the Israeli officer corps in comparison to 
conventional missions.91 
This reluctance diminished slowly and the ongoing resistance of the Palestinian 
public compelled the IDF to increase the quality of its officer corps in the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip. The focus of operations started to shift by the middle of 1988 from 
conventional duties to missions like imposing curfews, administering prisons for the 
detention of terrorists and suppressing public protests. The IDF also established and 
manned checkpoints in places connecting the Territories to Israel to prevent terrorists 
from entering Israel.92 
                                                 
89 “Fatalities in the First Intifada,” B’Tselem The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the 
Occupied Territories, accessed November 8, 2012, http://www.btselem.org/statistics/first_intifada_tables 
90 Raja Halwani and Tomis Kapitan, The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Philosophical Essays on Self-
Determination, Terrorism and the One-State Solution (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 146. 
91 Cohen, “Intifada,” 9. 
92 Ibid., 9-10. 
 42 
Until the beginning of the intifada, Israel had followed the principle of minimal 
contact in the Territories. With this principle, Israeli leadership sought to lower the 
chance of friction between Israeli officials and Palestinians to prevent the image of 
occupier as much as possible. In line with this principle, before the beginning of the 
intifada, the IDF had preserved the security in the Territories with only one brigade, 
mainly consisting of reserve soldiers.93 Nevertheless, the intifada and the rising role of 
the IDF in suppressing it forced the IDF leadership to increase the amount of troops 
substantially. The then IDF COS Dan Shomron indicated that in the beginning of 1988 
“there were more troops in Gaza alone than had been used to occupy all the Territories in 
1967.”94 In sum, the intifada had forced the IDF to focus both mentally and physically on 
counterterrorism. 
The changing nature of strategic calculations made it impossible for the IDF to 
abandon its fight against terrorism mainly caused by the events in the Territories. After 
the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, the Israeli leadership had welcomed the seizure of the 
Territories on the grounds that it would serve as a barrier between Israel and its Arab 
neighbors in a possible future conflict. Nevertheless, the peace treaty between Egypt and 
Israel in 1979 decreased the likelihood of such a conflict and strategic value of the 
Territories lessened accordingly. Because of this strategic situation, the IDF kept control 
of the Territories with a very low number of troops, and dedicated most of its time and 
resources to conventional missions.95 
Along with the beginning of the intifada, strategic calculations and perception of 
threats started to change significantly among the policymaking circles in Israel. As the 
severity of terrorist attacks intensified, the Israeli political leadership and the public 
changed their understanding of terrorism from an “on-going security concern” to an 
“existential threat.” Viewing terrorism as an existential threat had a huge impact on the 
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mission prioritization of the IDF. After the intifada, it became politically and strategically 
nearly impossible for the IDF to consider fighting against terrorism a secondary issue.96 
Shifting priorities from conventional threat to terrorism forced the IDF to make 
changes to its war fighting style, at both the operational and the tactical level. 
Operationally, the IDF lost its aggressive, offensive, blitzkrieg style operations to an 
attritional warfare, which demanded a long-time commitment of military and economic 
resources. Since its establishment in 1948, the IDF had fought its wars in quick and 
decisive manner, and the effectiveness of this operational style had proved itself as very 
effective in the fights against Arab states in 1948, 1967 and 1973. Israeli leaders wanted 
to apply this method to quell the intifada in the opening months. Then Minister of 
Defense Yitzhak Rabin wanted from the IDF to end the demonstrations with a “swift 
display of overwhelming force.” Nevertheless he quickly realized that rather than a 
blitzkrieg style operation, it was an attritional warfare that Israel was facing.97 
Eventually, the IDF, although reluctantly, started focusing much more on the fight 
against terrorism. Substantial resources and training time were diverted from 
conventional missions to counterterrorism missions. Then Head of the IDF’s Central 
Command (March 1991- March 1993) Maj. Gen. Danny Yatom acknowledged this shift 
of time and resources: 
Firstly, it was very difficult to divide resources, time, units for those two 
missions, which in many aspects, are contradictory, because if you wanted 
to prepare a unit for the next war, you should have given the unit the time 
and assets to conduct large-scale maneuver exercises, but if at the same 
time you needed the units to be deployed in Judea and Samaria [i.e., the 
West Bank], the units were no longer able to conduct the regular training 
programs. So, no doubt there were many disturbances…. No doubt, many 
training programs shortened and in many cases we had to just stop some 
of them.98 
The change of attitude in the operational level became even more serious when 
senior military leaders with large-scale combat experience retired near the end of 1990s. 
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Without the presence of experienced soldiers in conventional fighting in higher levels, 
the IDF became accustomed to fight against terrorism and focused on satisfactory 
achievements with an emphasis on minimal loss of soldiers rather than aiming for a 
decisive victory.99 
Dealing with terrorism also affected the IDF on the tactical level. To adjust to the 
new circumstances, the Israeli Army established new units that were designed to suppress 
demonstrations. These units were equipped with riot control equipment and started to use 
plastic bullets. The tactics and procedures that the IDF used during the intifada were very 
different from the ones that Israeli soldiers learned in military schools. The confusion that 
the intifada caused on the tactical level was evident in the words of Capt. (Res.) Noam 
Wiener: 
…I remember specifically sitting in officer school and we talked about 
different types of battle—offense, defense and ambushes, retreat, pursuit 
of the enemy—we tried to think what arrests in the West Bank are, and 
they did not really fit. They are not offense, because you do not attack to 
withhold territory, they are not a raid, because it is not somewhere you go, 
attack and then retreat and try to make a maximum effect. I thought that it 
did not match any of the regular military schemes, because it is not a 
military job, it is police work.100 
As a result, when the intifada ended with the signing of Oslo Peace Accord on 
September 13, 1993, the IDF was operationally and tactically on a much different path 
than the one that it had been on December 1987. Nevertheless, even the Oslo Peace 
Process final-status talks, which started after the signing of Oslo Peace Accord, did not 
mean an end to the terrorist attacks that Israel faced. Aware of this threat, the military 
leadership kept its focus on getting ready for counterterrorism missions. It would not take 
long to put these preparations to a test.  
The final-status talks between the Palestinian Authority and Israel Government 
ended with a failure, and the visit of Ariel Sharon (at the time head of the Likud Party) to 
the Temple Mount Mosque on September 28, 2000 ignited the second intifada, which is 
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often called the Al-Aqsa intifada. The level of violence in the Al-Aqsa intifada was much 
higher than in the first one. The tactics that the terrorists used this time were much more 
fatal. They included such methods as suicide bombings, short-range rocket and mortar 
attacks, roadside bombings and sniping. Due to the rising level of violence of the terrorist 
attacks, the IDF started to use much more lethal weapon platforms such as F-15I and F-
16 aircraft and AH-64-A Apache and AH-1 Cobra attack helicopters mostly in “surgical” 
air strikes. Artillery barrages and naval bombardment were other new counterterrorism 
measures that the IDF started to use with second intifada. Due to the increasingly bloody 
nature of the conflict, the number of fatalities raised enormously. The number of people 
who died in the first two weeks of the second intifada was equal to the number of deaths 
that took place in the first four months of the first one. Overall, 3,659 Palestinians and 
1,063 Israelis died during the Al-Aqsa intifada.101 Together with the Al-Aqsa intifada, the 
operational and tactical changes in the IDF started to speed up again. 
In order to decrease the casualty figures suffered against terrorist attacks 
especially in urban areas, the IDF upgraded its Tze’elim National Training Center in the 
Negev Desert. The aim was to improve the fighting abilities of Israeli soldiers in urban 
areas like the ones in the West Bank and Gaza.102 The IDF also started to use Merkava 
main battle tanks in order to improve protection of infantry units.103  
As it happened in the first intifada, most of the IDF units were required to remain 
continuously in the Territories throughout the years between 2000 and 2005. 
Consequently, Israeli soldiers did not have the chance to receive the training they needed 
to refine their fighting skills. An Israeli conscript spends 17 weeks a year in training, but 
since the beginning of the second intifada, they continuously served in the Territories and 
did not have this period of training.104 
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When the Second Lebanon War started on July 2006, 33 years had passed since 
the great victory that the IDF achieved against the Arab states in the Yom Kippur War of 
1973. Nevertheless, it soon became apparent that the IDF of 2006 was nowhere near the 
IDF of 1973. 
B. THE SECOND LEBANON WAR 
On July 12, 2006, Hezbollah terrorists infiltrated the border between Lebanon and 
Israel and kidnapped two IDF soldiers and killed three others. To divert attention from 
this operation, Hezbollah fired Katyusha rockets and mortars to the Israeli side of the 
border. The Israeli side responded to these with large-scale air and artillery 
bombardment. In a short period of time, these limited actions escalated into a war lasting 
34 days. 
Prior to the conflict in Lebanon, the IDF had planned for a coordinated air and 
ground operation to oust Hezbollah from southern Lebanon and to disarm it. The name of 
the air operation plan was Ice Breaker (Shoveret Hakerach), and the ground invasion plan 
had been named Mey Marom. Then Chief of Staff of the IDF Lieutenant General Dan 
Halutz rejected the ground plan believing that the air campaign would be enough to 
achieve the aim of ending Hezbollah both militarily and politically.105 
At the start of the campaign, the main goal of the IDF was to neutralize rocket 
launchers and command and control centers of Hezbollah. In accordance with ICE 
BREAKER, Halutz also wanted to hit counter-value targets (enemy’s population and 
economic centers) to compel the Lebanese government to pressure Hezbollah to stop its 
attacks into Israel territory. The Israeli government refused the demand on the grounds 
that it would damage the public support to the pro-western government of Lebanon and 
lead to its collapse.106 
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Figure 2.  Map of Theater (The Second Lebanon War)107 
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On the night of July 13, the IDF seemed to be the winner of this short exchange 
against Hezbollah, because the Israeli Air Force (IAF) had managed to destroy most of 
the long-range rocket launchers and had seriously damaged Hezbollah command centers 
located in the Dahiya quarter of Beirut. When Halutz called Prime Minister Ehud Olmert 
to inform him about the success of the air campaign, he said: “all the long-range rockets 
have been destroyed. We’ve won the war.”108 Apparently he was wrong. The next day 
the Lebanese government asked for a ceasefire, but the Israeli side refused with the 
intention of damaging Hezbollah seriously and breaking its backbone. As Avi Kober 
indicated, “In Clausewitzian terms, once the IAF completed its missions during the initial 
stages of the war…Israel reached the culminating point of the attack.”109 From this 
moment on everything went worse for the Israeli side. 
After the initial air campaign of the IAF, Hasan Nasrallah, the Secretary-General 
of Hezbollah, sent a taped message to the press. He addressed the Israelis: “You wanted 
an open war, and we are heading for an open war. We are ready for it.” Augustus Richard 
Norton, a retired U.S. Army officer and a former UN observer in southern Lebanon, later 
attracted attention to a special moment in this taped message when Nasrallah told 
listeners to look to the sea and there was a perfectly timed explosion on the horizon. The 
explosion caused by a C-802 Noor guided missile hitting the INS Hanit (a Sa’ar 5-class 
corvette of the Israeli Navy). The missile attack inflicted four casualties. As Norton 
indicated, this was a signal to the Israeli side that Hezbollah was very well prepared for 
this war.110 
As the results of the IAF’s air strikes failed to bring the result of stopping rocket 
attacks and neutralizing Hezbollah as a force in Lebanon, the political and military 
leadership of Israel decided to use ground forces. The first large-scale ground incursion 
started on July 17. Soon, the Israeli units realized that they were in a different conflict 
from the ones that they had against terrorists in the Territories.  
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The main difference was that Hezbollah fighters did not abandon their positions 
after the initial contact with Israeli soldiers as they did in the past; instead they fought 
tenaciously to hold their positions. They even managed to surround the elite Maglan unit. 
The commander of the IDF’s northern sector had to send reinforcements to save the 
unit.111 Hezbollah fighters used a well-designed tunnel system to defend their positions. 
They combined this tunnel network with effective small arms, anti-tank and mortar fire, 
inflicting several casualties and damaging or destroying armored vehicles of Israeli units.  
Faced with the inefficiency of regular units against entrenched positions of 
Hezbollah, Olmert and Halutz had no chance but to call up reserve forces on July 21. On 
the same day, Israel had to demand an emergency resupply of precision-guided munitions 
from the U.S., as the IAF had used all of its stocks and had failed to achieve the aim of 
stopping Hezbollah from firing rockets into the Israeli territory.112 
In an attempt to control the ground positions that Hezbollah used to fire its short-
range Katyushas, Halutz ordered the northern sector commander Lt. Gen. Udi Adams to 
capture the town of Bint Jbeil and wanted him to accomplish this mission by using only 
one battalion. Adams tried to increase the amount of troops, but Halutz rejected. The 
attack started on the morning of July 26 with heavy artillery fire. As the first units started 
to pour into the town at 0530, they came under intense fire from all around. Hezbollah 
fighters successfully maneuvered to flanking positions and hit the Israeli units from these 
positions by using direct and indirect fire.113 At the end of the day, the IDF had suffered 
36 casualties, nine dead and 27 wounded.114 Dissatisfied with his performance, Halutz 
removed the northern sector commander Adams from his position and assigned Major 
General Moshe Kaplinsky to lead the ground effort in the north. 
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On the first day of August, the reserve forces gathered around the border areas. As 
they started to get into fighting in Southern Lebanon, it became very soon evident that 
they were seriously lacking in discipline and training. A reservist from Jerusalem 
confessed that:  
In the past six years I’ve only had a week’s training. Soon after we 
arrived, we received an order to seize a nearby Shi’ite village. We knew 
that we were not properly trained for the mission. We told our 
commanders we could control the village with firepower and there was no 
need to take it and be killed for nothing. Luckily we were able to convince 
our commander…For the last six years we were engaged in stupid 
policing missions in the West Bank. Checkpoints, hunting stone-throwing 
Palestinian children…the result was that we were not ready to confront 
real fighters like Hezbollah.115 
By August 5, the IDF had deployed more than 10,000 soldiers in southern 
Lebanon, but Hezbollah was still holding to their positions in the towns of Maroun al Ras 
and Bint Jbeil and rockets were still hitting Israeli neighborhoods.116 On August 11, the 
UN Security Council passed Resolution 1701, which called for a “full cessation of 
hostilities….”117 
Olmert and the Defense Minister Amir Peretz decided to send more ground forces 
into southern Lebanon to establish a buffer zone at the northern side before the conflict 
come to a total end. This last-minute assault led to additional disasters for the IDF. 
Upon receiving the order to move northwards, the airborne reserve division 
entered the town of Dibel on August 11. When the Hezbollah fighters engaged the 
division with small arms fire upon entering the town, some 110 reserve soldiers entered 
buildings around to find cover.118 This was a tactic that the IDF forces used when they 
were fighting against terrorists in the Territories. The tactic was very effective against 
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lightly armed Palestinian terrorists, but this time the enemy had anti-tank guided missiles. 
Two Hezbollah antitank missiles hit the building and killed 9 and wounded 31 IDF 
soldiers. The habits that the IDF soldiers made during years of policing missions against 
Palestinian terrorists were proving to be extremely detrimental for the conventional 
fighting abilities of the IDF. Before the ceasefire went into effect on August 14, the 
airborne reserve division had managed to move only one mile northwards.119 
Another instance around the region of Wadi al-Saluki revealed the current 
situation of the long-feared IDF armored units. When 24 tanks of Brigade 401 entered the 
area, they supposed that the infantry units of Division 162 had cleared the area from 
Hezbollah fighters, which quickly proved to be wrong. As the leading two tanks entered 
the town, they found a collapsed building blocking the main road. While they were trying 
to figure out what to do, an explosion from an IED or mine collapsed the road. 
Immediately after the explosion, the entire column left under a swarm of antitank 
missiles. At the end of the shooting, 11 of the 24 Merkava tanks had been hit by anti-tank 
missiles. One important detail showed how much the IDF had lost its conventional 
fighting abilities. During hours of fighting in Wadi al-Saluki, all tank crews had failed to 
use their smoke screens to protect themselves from the missiles. It was pretty normal, as 
they did not need them for years against stone-throwing Palestinian children.120 A total of 
400 tanks joined the fight in southern Lebanon; 48 were hit.121 
Heavy involvement of the IDF in Israel’s counterterrorist effort not only 
debilitated its conventional fighting ability but also undermined the overall 
counterterrorism campaign in other ways. 
First of all, because the IDF used excessive force and caused civilian casualties in 
most of its operations, the attitudes of Palestinians towards terrorism changed 
dramatically. While Palestinian support to suicide attacks was around 25% during the 
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1990s, it was about 75% during the first two years of the Al-Aqsa intifada.122 In addition, 
Palestinians became much more inclined to favor military operations in their struggle 
against the Israelis. When the IDF operations intensified during 2002 and 2003, the 
percentage of Palestinians supporting the continuation of military operations against 
Israeli targets reached about 70%, up from around 35% at the end of 1990s.123 The rising 
level of violence also galvanized support for military action among the Israeli population. 
In 2002, around 75% of the Israelis favored the military option in controlling Palestinian 
terrorist activities.124 
Second, arbitrary killings of Palestinian civilians by the IDF inspired retaliatory 
motivations, especially among young Palestinians. This desire for vengeance in large part 
turned into suicide attacks against Israeli targets. Nafez al-Nether admitted the role of 
vengeance by saying he wanted to avenge the blood of Palestinians killed by Israel before 
detonating himself and killing several Israeli soldiers on July 9, 2001. It was no surprise 
that one of these Palestinians whom Nafez avenged was his own brother Fayez, who died 
during the first intifada in clashes in the Jabalya refugee camp.125 
Third, by replying to Palestinian terrorist attacks in an equal or much more violent 
way, the IDF worked to the advantage of radical groups like Hamas that seek to become 
popular among Palestinians by trying to create a popular image of the protector of the 
people. Largely due to this perception among the population, Hamas managed to win the 
elections in January 2006 by receiving around 39% of all votes.126 
Fourth, the active role that the IDF played in the policymaking process with 
regard to counterterrorist effort caused problems in civil-military relations. The role 
played by the civilians in devising counterterrorist strategies largely remained marginal 
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since the beginning of the first intifada. In critical matters like the peace negotiations 
between Palestinians and Israel during the 1990s, it was the IDF general staff’s strategic 
planning division that shaped the political position of the Israeli government. After 
Benjamin Netanyahu became prime minister in 1996, he declared that he viewed it as 
detrimental for the IDF to be involved heavily with political matters. When Netanyahu 
tried to prevent military officials from taking place in political discussions, senior officers 
criticized him publicly for doing that. Netanyahu become largely unsuccessful in 
establishing civilian supremacy over policy matters and lost elections against a former 
soldier Ehud Barak in 1999. Barak also had problems with the IDF when he chose to 
continue negotiations with the Palestinian Authority in 2000 in spite of the rising 
violence because of the second intifada. The military perceived the continuing struggle 
against terrorists as a war and found it irrelevant to further political negotiations. Major 
General Moshe Ya’alon, as then the head of the IDF Central Region Command, criticized 
the cabinet members and prime minister publicly for damaging the IDF’s ability to win 
the battles. 
C. CONCLUSION 
The Israeli State faces a number of state and non-state threats. As a result of this, 
it is much more difficult for the Israeli political and military leaders to understand the 
character of conflict that they face. Clausewitz argued that: 
The first, the supreme, the most far reaching act of judgment that the 
statesman and commander have to make is to establish the kind of war on 
which they are embarking, neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it 
into something that is alien to its nature. This is the first of all strategic 
questions and the most comprehensive.127 
The IDF treated Hezbollah as the adversary it faced in the Palestinian territories 
and paid the price for this mistake. As the former chief of the IDF’s Operational Theory 
Research Institute, retired General Shimon Naveh, indicated:  
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… The IDF fell in love with what it was doing with the Palestinians…in 
fact it became addictive. You know when you fight a war against a rival 
who is by all means inferior to you, you may lose a guy here or there, but 
you are in total control. It is nice you pretend that you fight the war and 
yet it is not really a dangerous war….I remember talking to five brigade 
commanders….I asked them if they had an idea…what it meant to go into 
battle against a Syrian division? Did they have in mind what a barrage of 
10 Syrian artillery battalions looked like?128 
General Naveh’s words clearly show that the IDF officers and soldiers had 
distanced themselves from conventional fighting. Years of policing missions in places 
like Gaza or the West Bank made Israeli soldiers believe that they were fighting all the 
time and they did not need any other training to maintain their skills in conventional 
fighting, but this assumption was severely wrong and the IDF paid the price by losing 
114 of its soldiers.129 Nearly six years have passed since the end of the Second Lebanon 
War, and there are still discussions about the winners of the conflict. Nevertheless, there 
seems to be a consensus among the Israeli politicians and soldiers that the IDF’s 
conventional fighting abilities are not anywhere near the standards of the once-feared IDF 
of the 1970s. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Since the French Revolution, use of force has been the standard response of states 
to terrorism. The use of the term “terrorism” dates back to the Jacobin reign of terror 
between March 1793 and July 1794.130 The main instrument that states have used in that 
regard has been their military force. Yet it would be unfair to blame only politicians or 
rulers for their repressive responses to terrorism because they usually only act in 
accordance with the popular passion and anxiety that shape in the public as a result of 
terrorist attacks. In some cases, military response brought success and in others failure; 
but frequently, using military force brought enormous unintended costs regardless of the 
end result. History has showed that such repressive reactions to terrorism have been 
largely ineffective and failed to gain the upper hand against terrorist organizations. 
As Audrey Kurth Cronin notes, terrorism picks at the vulnerable seam between 
domestic law and foreign war and therefore it becomes harder for policymakers to decide 
how to treat it either as criminality or warfare. Political leaders tend to view the military 
option as more appropriate for both cases—criminality or warfare—because military, 
unlike police, seem to have the required capabilities to work in both of these areas.  
Aware of this tendency, many terrorist organizations have used a state’s military 
reaction to their attacks as part of their strategies in achieving their overall goals. Cronin 
identifies three terrorist tactics that use state action at their core. First is provocation. In 
this strategy, terrorists provoke the state to do something that would eventually 
undermine its legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens. An example of the application of 
provocation strategy can be seen in the acts of the Russian group Narodnaya Volya. They 
attacked the representatives of the tsarist regime to provoke a brutal response that would 
in turn inspire a peasant uprising. The second strategy is polarization. In this strategy, 
terrorists try to use repressive actions of the state to further polarize societies that are 
already fragmented. By doing that, terrorists seek to eliminate the possibility of 
fragmented societies finding a middle ground, and as a result establish two different 
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entities with their own state structure. LTTE of Sri Lanka is a good example of a terrorist 
organization that used polarization as a strategy. The last strategy is mobilization. With 
this strategy, terrorist groups aim to recruit new members and rally masses for their 
causes. The attack of Palestinian terrorists in the 1972 Munich Olympics is an example of 
the use of mobilization strategy. Terrorist groups usually use a combination of all of these 
tactics and states have fallen into these strategic traps mostly because they used military 
force and repressive measures as their main counterterrorist instruments.131 
In fact, in the past, some authoritarian regimes with extremely repressive 
measures have been able to be successful against these terrorist tactics. Nevertheless, a 
closer look at some of the cases where states use extreme measures (e.g., Argentina 
against leftist groups or Russia against Chechen terrorism) shows that, even in these 
cases, the long-term consequences have been largely negative in spite of the short-term 
success against the terrorist groups. 
In Russia’s case, it took nearly 13 years for Russians to stop terrorism, even with 
total disregard for democratic values and human rights. The conflict between the 
Russians and Chechens took place in two phases. The first phase started in 1994. In the 
background of the conflict was Chechnya’s demand to declare its independence from the 
Soviet Union, following the dissolution of the Union at the end of the Cold War. 
President Boris Yeltsin refused to recognize the Chechen state and sent around 2,500 
troops to confront Chechen fighters. Nevertheless, the Russian parliament overruled the 
President’s decision to use force and as a result Russian soldiers withdrew from the 
region. Three years later, Russians returned to Chechnya because of a series of bus 
hijackings and kidnappings and, this time, Yeltsin was determined to finish off the 
Chechen problem. The result was a total bloodbath. Although the figures are highly 
disputed, casualty figures for Russian soldiers were anywhere from 5,500 to 14,000. The 
suffering of Chechen civilians was much greater. Although these figures are also 
disputed, at least 50,000 civilians died and as many as 300,000 Chechens became 
refugees in a nation of under a million.132 Contrary to the expectation of Russians, 
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Chechen fighters proved themselves as a highly trained, disciplined force and fought 
effectively against Russian forces in spite of the latter’s superior firepower. Russians 
failed to devise strategies against this competent force other than increasing the level of 
violence and engaging in inhumane activities such as raping, looting and random 
shooting of civilians. Nevertheless, Russians managed to gain control of Grozny in the 
middle of 1995 and Chechen fighters retreated to mountainous areas. At around the same 
time, Shamil Basayev, a leader of Chechen fighters, took 1,200 civilians hostage in a 
hospital in the Russian city of Budennovsk. Russian soldiers (including Spetznaz Special 
Forces) made three attempts to end this terrorist act by eliminating all the Chechen 
fighters in the hospital. They became unsuccessful; in addition, they caused more civilian 
casualties than the terrorists caused during the whole event. The crisis ended when the 
Russian government granted Chechen fighters safe passage back to Chechnya. The 
Budennovsk crisis showed Chechens’ willingness to use terrorist tactics to reach their 
goal; after the crisis, the Russians decided to negotiate with the Chechens and as a result 
parties signed the Kasavyurt Accords. According to this accord, both sides agreed to end 
the violence in return for economic aid to the region and a referendum on the future of 
Chechnya to be held in five years.133 The second phase of the conflict started when 
Basayev carried out incursions into neighboring Dagestan in 1999 with an aim to 
establishing an Islamic Republic there. Succeeding Boris Yeltsin as President, Vladimir 
Putin viewed the second part of the conflict as an opportunity to exact revenge for the 
first conflict and labeled it as a war against terrorism. In the face of overwhelming 
Russian military power, Chechens again started to use terrorist attacks against Russian 
civilians. In October 2002, Chechens captured a theater in Moscow and held 800 civilians 
hostage. Russian Special Forces used an anesthetic gas to incapacitate terrorists before 
raiding the theater; as a result, along with 49 terrorists, 129 civilians lost their lives. In 
another terrorist attack, Chechens captured a school and took around 1,100 hostages, 
most of them schoolchildren. In the firefight between the terrorists and Russian forces 
more than 300 civilians lost their lives.134 As can be seen from both of these instances, 
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Russians replied to terrorist attacks with no regard to the protection of civilian life and 
applied some of the most repressive measures and tactics that a state can use against an 
adversary. Government controlled the media and limited the public’s awareness about the 
real cost of the conflict by misinforming people with wrong numbers about casualties. In 
the end, Russia managed to end terrorism in Chechnya in 2007 because there were 
literally no Chechens willing to lead the fight against Russians or simply it was too hard 
for the terrorists to recruit because fighting against the Russians was nearly equal to 
signing one’s own death sentence. It is unclear whether Chechens will stay submissive to 
Moscow in the future but it is clear that the repressive tactics that Russians used against 
Chechens led to the radicalization of other groups in the region that are unsatisfied with 
the government in Moscow. In some of the neighboring areas, like Ingushetia and 
Dagestan, groups with radical Wahhabi values have gained powerbase and continuing to 
pose threats for the future. In addition, young people of the region who witnessed nothing 
but violence throughout their childhood pose another threat with their possible 
willingness to use force in the future in order to avenge the loss of their loved ones. The 
Foreign Minister of Chechnya, Ilias Akhmadov, voiced his concern about the future: 
It will probably be more horrible than you would like to think. Because the 
young generation which is now growing up and which hasn’t seen 
anything but war and violence; who knows nothing except ‘Mr. 
Kalashnikov’; who are brave to the point of insanity; who don’t have a 
drop of mercy or regret because their relatives were killed in front of them, 
their sisters were raped, their houses were destroyed…These people have 
nothing.135 
Nevertheless, the Russian case shows that a government can end terrorism, if it is 
willing to destroy everything and kill everyone that terrorists need to survive. 
The Argentina case is probably the most notable example of how an authoritarian 
government and the military can traumatize nearly all of the society while trying to end 
terrorism. The dirty war, which the military waged against left-wing groups after the 
coup d’état of March 24, 1976, caused the death or disappearing of anywhere between 
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8,000 to 30,000 people. In between 1976 to 1983, three successive military juntas ruled 
the country until the defeat of Argentine in the Malvinas-Falklands War against Britain. 
During that time, the military applied some brutal counterterrorist tactics such as 
abducting people and questioning them under severe torture and then killing and burying 
them in unmarked graves. The military’s definition of terrorist was so widespread that 
many people with no record of violent or criminal behavior lost their lives in clandestine 
detention centers that were used to detain, interrogate and eliminate suspected terrorists. 
General Jorge Videla, who ruled the country until March 29, 1981, described terrorists as 
“not just someone with a gun or a bomb, but also someone who spreads ideas that are 
contrary to Western and Christian civilization.”136 
Terrorism and terrorist attacks gained prominence in Argentina around 1969 
because of the social mobilization created by the disenchantment towards the military 
that was ruling the country since 1966. Nevertheless, the real roots of the conflict were in 
the 1950s. When the military staged a coup and deposed Juan Peron from power in 1955, 
it became highly problematic to satisfy the people who were avid supporters of the 
Peronist movement. Between 1955 and 1966, five presidents–three civilians and two 
generals–ruled the country. In 1966, General Juan Carlos Onganía seized the power after 
a coup but this time the military was planning to stay in power for a long time to make 
some fundamental changes both socially and economically in the country. When people 
realized the ineffectiveness of the new military rule, they started to support a resort to 
violence to remove the generals from power. In 1969, there were six terrorist 
organizations in Argentina and in 1974, after a couple of mergers, two terrorist 
organizations–Monteneros and People’s Revolutionary Army (ERP)–were fighting 
against the military rule. At that moment, large parts of the population were in support of 
“terrorism” against the military. In a survey conducted in 1971, 45.5% of respondents 
living in Greater Buenos Aires area and 49.5% in the rest of the country viewed terrorism 
as “justified.” In the elections of 1973, Peronist presidential candidate Héctor J. Cámpora 
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managed to secure the 49.56% of the popular vote and that meant the military’s failure in 
preventing Peronist ideas gaining supremacy in the country.137  
The election victory of Peronists led to the escalation of violence in two ways. 
First, the terrorist groups viewed the electoral success as a result of their violent actions 
and regarded use of force as a very effective way of making political change. Second, the 
military interpreted the return of Peronists to power and the rising influence of terrorism 
in the country as the powerful indicators of a revolution in the country. As a result, the 
military leaders justified in their minds that the military should use all kind of violent 
actions against this revolutionary movement to prevent the country from falling off the 
cliff. Largely as a result of this belief that terrorist violence and economic chaos were 
dragging Argentina to the brink of a revolution, the military seized power again in 1976. 
After the elections in 1973, terrorist organizations decided to keep on their violent 
actions, believing that they were very close to achieving their aim of having a revolution 
in Argentina, and even increased the intensity of their attacks to make it much faster. As a 
result, while there were 352 terrorist incidents in 1972, this number reached 413 in 1973 
and 807 in 1974.138 That had been possible because terrorist organizations had increased 
their ranks as a result of the disaffection of people with the military rule and they had also 
had achieved enormous financial power through the ransoms that they got for kidnapping 
people (mostly the representatives of multinational corporations working in Argentina). 
With this enormous manpower and financial power in their hands, terrorists escalated the 
level of violence to a point that political and military leaders felt that terrorist violence 
could only be dealt with by extreme repressive measures.139 
From 1973 to 1976, the main counterterrorist instrument of the government was 
an organization called the Triple A (Argentine Anti-Communist Alliance). The aim of the 
organization was simply to eliminate the opponents of the regime. The actions of Triple 
A were all state-sponsored and the members of the organization were largely drawn from 
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the state’s security apparatus (either military or police). Until the military coup of 1976, 
membership was limited to a chosen group of people but after the military took over 
power, nearly all security forces engaged in similar activities. As a result of this state 
terrorism, the military rule became successful in ending terrorism and exterminated both 
the ERP and Monteneros.140 
A closer look at the effects of these repressive measures of the Argentine 
government is helpful in understanding the possible effects of repressive measures in 
other cases. First of all, as the government increased the pressure over the terrorist 
organizations, they were forced to go underground to achieve survival. After going 
underground, terrorists became isolated from the larger population and were not able to 
recognize the decreasing level of support to violence in the general population after the 
elections of 1973. Instead, they kept on applying their tactics of “the more, the better,” 
which aimed to delegitimize the government in the eyes of the public by provoking it to 
undertake repressive actions. This tactic had worked before 1973 and the military rule 
had lost its legitimacy when it responded to terrorist actions, which large parts of 
population viewed as “justified” at that time. Terrorists kept on applying the same tactic 
with the hope of achieving the same result, but this time the public was not willing to 
justify terrorist actions; instead, they were willing to give normal politics a chance. 
Therefore, by cutting the link between terrorists and population through repressive 
measures that isolated the terrorist organizations, government indirectly caused terrorists 
to maintain violence for longer because they believed that the public supported their 
activities.141 
Second, the isolation caused by the government action forced terrorists to view 
the terrorist organizations as a substitute for a normal family. As the bonds between 
members grew tighter, it became much harder for terrorists to abandon the group and 
leave other members—whom they viewed as surrogate family members—alone. 
Moreover, after losing their fellow comrades in their fight against the state, the remaining 
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terrorists became much more willing to fight in order to avenge their loss.142 In the end, 
repressive actions largely led to the escalation of violence through strengthening 
organizational bonds. 
Lastly, there is also the incalculable price that Argentine society paid as a result of 
the “dirty war” that the government waged in order to end terrorism. Loss of family 
members traumatized the lives of their relatives for years and, in the face of rising 
violence, the country suffered economically, which affected nearly all parts of the 
society. 
The cases of both Russia and Argentina show that states are able to end terrorism 
when they do not care about losing their legitimacy and when they are willing to ignore 
the existence of anything related to human rights. Even in these cases, it is clear that 
bringing the end of terrorism through repression brings enormous costs in other areas.  
This study tried to show these costs in the cases of two democratic countries. Both 
of these cases showed that using militaries in counterterrorism roles has a high possibility 
of creating drawbacks and unwelcome consequences. 
First, in both Northern Ireland and Israel, the military forces became an agent of 
escalation of violence by antagonizing the civilian population. As Colonel Michael 
Dewar, a former British Army officer and a veteran of several Northern Ireland tours, 
noted, “No army, however well it conducts itself, is suitable for police work.”143 As 
happened after Bloody Sunday in Northern Ireland and after counterterrorist operations 
of the IDF in both intifadas, disputed killings of innocent civilians by the soldiers proved 
to be very good propaganda opportunities for terrorist organizations. These disputed 
killings worked to the advantage of terrorist organizations by increasing their chance of 
recruiting new members who wanted revenge for these “atrocities” caused by the 
military. 
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Second, in each case the military needed to divert itself from its main duty, which 
is the defense of the country from external enemies. By using resources and time that was 
needed to prepare for a conventional war, both Britain and Israel risked a disastrous 
defeat if called upon to wage a war against an adversary fighting in a conventional way. 
In Britain’s case, the military proved itself as capable of fighting conventionally in the 
Falklands War, but the IDF suffered humiliation against Hezbollah when the latter 
applied conventional tactics in the 2006 confrontation and inflicted enormous casualties 
against an IDF that had concentrated on counterterrorism missions for nearly 20 years. 
Third, in Israel and Britain, counterterrorist campaigns that lasted for many years 
caused tensions over civil-military relations. As the counterterrorist policies got 
militarized, military leaders achieved supremacy over the shaping of policies and the 
civilian politicians were sidelined. In extreme cases like that of Argentina, these 
counterterrorism missions provided the military leaders with a pretext for subverting 
normal democratic rules and establishing dictatorial rules through military coups. In 
Britain and Israel, military leaders did not go as far as taking over the government. In 
fact, in the British case, civil-military relations improved as democratic civilian control of 
the military increased when the politicians became much more involved in the overall 
counterterrorist effort. This goes against the conventional wisdom that internal missions 
erode the civilian control over the military. Nevertheless, both the British and Israeli 
generals showed that they tend to ignore other ways of solving problems and simply 
focus on military option to deal with terrorism when civilian politicians do not properly 
supervise them. Highly militarized policies against terrorism also caused societies to 
regard the military option in the long term as a viable choice for finding solutions to 
political problems. Israel is a good example of this case. As terrorist attacks increased 
their intensity in the beginning of the 2000s, Israel responded with lethal military 
counterterrorist operations, and this created a spiral of violence in the region, which in 
turn made the Israeli public much more supportive of military solutions. 
Lastly, the use of military in counterterrorism caused legitimacy problems for 
each country, both domestically and internationally. In Northern Ireland, the British 
government failed to bring justice many times by not allowing trial of soldiers who were 
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suspects of causing innocent civilian deaths. Use of techniques like “deep interrogation” 
undermined the image of the UK as a democratic country that is respectful of basic 
human rights. Counterterrorist tactics used by the IDF largely ignored human rights 
issues and caused legal problems by causing many civilian casualties. 
In spite of these negative consequences that the militaries caused in 
counterterrorism operations, many countries in the world keep on using their militaries in 
counterterrorism missions. The important issue for the countries that decide to use their 
militaries in counterterrorism is to decide about the end situation that they want to reach. 
Without a properly defined end situation, it is extremely hard to decide about the proper 
means of reaching that end. As can be seen from the cases in this study, the use of only 
military means fail to bring an end to the terrorism. In counterterrorism, means like 
economic power, diplomacy, intelligence and legal resources like police and judiciary are 
also at least as important as military means.  
Liberal democracies need to be very precise in their use of force. They need to be 
careful in preserving constitutional order and preserve democratic values like the rule of 
law and the people’s right to live. The latter issue is important both in preventing 
terrorists from hurting the general public and in ensuring that innocent civilians are not 
hurt through state violence. In the end, both civilian politicians and military leaders 
should remember, before making any decisions about terrorism, that the most basic aim 
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